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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
SANDRA SHEIKH, I 
Petitioner, 
STATE OF UTAH/UTAH DEPARTMENT 
OF PUBLIC SAFETY, 
Respondent. 
1 BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
i Case No. 940563-CA 
i Priority 14 
STATEMENT OP JURISDICTION 
This appeal is from a final judgment of the Industrial 
Commission of the State of Utah. Jurisdiction is conferred upon 
this court under Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-6 (1993) and Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (a) (Supp. 1994). 
NATURE OP THE PROCEEDINGS 
A formal evidentiary hearing was held tinder Utah Code Ann. § 
34-35-7.1 (1993) and Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-8 (1993) before an 
Administrative Law Judge's (ALJ) of the Utah Industrial Commission 
(Commission). His decision was appealed to the Commission. The 
Commission issued a final agency order on August 25, 1994, denying 
Petitioner's Motion for Review and sustaining the ALJ's decision. 
Petitioner Sandra Sheikh (Sheikh) filed her Petition for Review of 
the Commission's Order on September 23, 1994. 
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ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Did the Commission correctly conclude Petitioner Sheikh 
did not establish a prima facie case of discrimination against her 
by the Department of Public Safety because of her pregnancy? In 
any event, is this issue irrelevant where the factfinder found, 
based on all the evidence presented by both parties, that no such 
illegal discrimination had occurred? 
Whether or not a prima facie case has been made out is a 
question of law, £££ Call v. Citv of West Jordan. 727 P.2d 180, 182 
(Utah 1986), which is reviewed for correctness, Zissi v. Tax 
Comm'n. 842 P.2d 848, 852-3 & n. 2 (Utah 1992). However, this 
issue is rendered irrelevant where the employer attempts to rebut 
an employee's accusation of unlawful discrimination; instead, the 
focus shifts to the factfinder's ultimate determination of whether 
the complainant has proved that prohibited discrimination occurred. 
United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens. 460 U.S. 
711, 715-16 (1983) (cited in State v. Harrison. 805 P.2d 769, 777 
(Utah App. 1991)); £££ generally University of Utah v. Industrial 
Comm'n. 736 P.2d 630 (Utah 1987) (Discussing shifting burden of 
production of evidence--not ultimate burden of proof--under Utah 
Anti-Discrimination Act). 
2. Should the Court accept, as supported by substantial 
evidence, the Commission's findings and conclusion that no such 
discrimination occurred in light of Petitioner's failure to 
marshall the record evidence supporting those findings? 
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One who challenges an agency's factual findings under Utah 
Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(g) (1993) must marshall all the evidence 
supporting those findings and then show that despite that evidence 
and the reasonable inferences therefrom, the findings are not 
supported by substantial evidence on the whole record. Kennecott 
Corp. v. State Tax Common. 858 P.2d 1381, 1385 (Utah 1993); T W ^ r s 
Ltd. Inc. v. Department Enrol. Sec. 863 P,2d 12, 18 (Utah App. 
1993), cert, denied. 878 P.2d 1154 (Utah 1994) . If the marshalling 
burden is not met, the reviewing court accepts the challenged 
findings- E.g.. Johnson v. Board of Review. 842 P.2d 910, 912 
(Utah App. 1992). 
3. Is there substantial evidence to support the Commission's 
findings and conclusion that the Department of Public Safety did 
not discriminate against Sheikh because of her pregnancy in setting 
the dispatchers' work schedule for the three weeks after her return 
from maternity leave? 
Substantial evidence is "that quantum and quality of relevant 
evidence that is adequate to convince a reasonable mind to support 
a conclusion-" First Nat'l Bank v. County Bd. of Equalization. 799 
P.2d 1163, 1165 (Utah 1990); acgprfl Grace Drilling Co. v. Board of 
Review, 776 P.2d 63, 68 (Utah App. 1989). A reviewing court does 
not redetermine credibility or reweigh the record evidence, Ouestar 
Pipeline Co. v. State Tax Comm'n. 850 P.2d 1175, 1178 (Utah 1993), 
or substitute its judgment as between two reasonably conflicting 
inferences that could be drawn from the record evidence, 
3 
Albertsong. Inc. v. Department Empi. Sec. 854 P.2d 570# 575 (Utah 
App. 1993). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
The following statutes are applicable in this matter. The 
text of the provisions either appears in argument or in the 
Addendum to this brief. 
STATUTES ? 
1. Utah Code Ann. § 34-35-6(1) (a) (i) (1993) 
2. Utah Code Ann. § 34-35-7.1 (1993) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Petitioner Sheikh was a dispatcher for the Department of 
Public Safety in the Price dispatch center. She became pregnant 
and took maternity leave from her position. After one week back at 
work, Petitioner resigned. Her schedule had been modified to 
account for the training of a new employee. She did not complain 
to management of the modified schedule and had not asked for 
modifications to her schedule before her resignation on May 10, 
1990. 
On August 14# 1990, three months after her resignation, 
Petitioner filed a charge of discrimination (R.l# Addendum H) based 
on pregnancy. An evidentiary hearing was held before an ALJ of the 
Commission who found that the actions of the Department were not 
discriminatory and denied Petitioner's claim (Addendum A). 
Petitioner appealed to the full Commission to review the ALJ's 
findings and conclusions. The Commission adopted the findings and 
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conclusions of the ALJ and sustained his decision (Addendum B) . 
From that decision, Petitioner appeals to this court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This appeal consists of a challenge to the ALJ's findings and 
the conclusions drawn therefrom. As such, the starting place for 
reciting the facts are those as stated by the ALJ in his decision. 
Respondent does not deem it necessary to recite each of the 
findings so found and refers the Court to Addendum A which contains 
the decision of the ALJ. Point III of this brief contains a 
detailed recitation of evidence supporting the findings of the ALJ 
and therefore specific Record citations will not be contained in 
the following factual summary. The following is a narrative of the 
findings of Addendum A to help the Court understand the background 
for this appeal. 
Sheikh had been a dispatcher in the Price dispatch center for 
10 and 1/2 years prior to her resignation from the Department of 
Public Safety in May 1990. For the last two years of her 
employment, she had been an employee of the State Department of 
Public Safety after a consolidation with the county center. 
On October 26, 1989, Sheikh received a copy of the center's 
Information and requirement sheet. She read it, signed it and 
understood its contents. That sheet (Exhibit R-4, Addendum C) 
contained both positive and negative expressions of the position 
and explained what was required of dispatchers. " Included among the 
things required were the necessity of working various schedules, 
being unable to choose days off, shifts worked, having to be 
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available at all times, being required to obtain child care at one 
hour's notice any time of day or night and having to work through 
breaks. These factors created much stress and caused difficulty 
with one's personal and social life. 
The Price Center was understaffed and had little flexibility 
in the number of dispatchers that could be used. Temporary 
employees (AJs) could be used if necessary but only after permanent 
employees could not fill the necessary shifts. There was no 
separate budget for AJs and therefore the use of AJs was limited. 
At one point of time after consolidation, the schedule was 
straight shifts which went by seniority and gave }ess senior 
employees the least desirable shifts. The straight schedule was 
changed to a two week rotating schedule. The two week rotational 
schedule gave little time for employees to adjust and created what 
was called "double back" or "short change" which was working a 
second shift with only 8 or 9 hours between shifts. 
After employees complained about the two week rotational 
schedule, one dispatcher, John Kelly, prepared a three week 
rotational schedule and presented his proposal to dispatch center 
director Nancy Hansen for consideration. After discussion with 
center dispatchers, including Sheikh, it was adopted and 
implemented effective March 3, 1990 (Exhibit P-5, Addendum D). 
Before Sheikh went on maternity leave, Hansen met with Sheikh 
and went over the proposed schedule that Sheikh would be returning 
to when she came back from maternity leave as projected by the 
newly adopted three week rotational schedule. Sheikh had seen the 
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particular rotational for the three three-week period for her 
actual return (Exhibit R-l# Addendum E) . This rotational schedule 
was in effect at the time Sheikh returned from maternity leave. 
The rotational shifts as planned were for basic shifts. 
Actual shifts worked would vary because of time off people would 
need for vacation, sickness or personal emergencies. If such took 
place, adjustments needed to be made to cover shifts not covered by 
the absent employees. 
While Sheikh was on maternity leave, Patti, one of the 
permanent employees, resigned. A new employee, Russele was J^ ired 
in mid April to take Patti's position. Russele was assigned to 
take over Patti#s schedule since all other permanent employees 
already had their assigned schedule under the three week rotational 
schedule• 
It was department policy that a new employee or someone who 
was in training could not be on a graveyard shift alone. As a 
result, Russele could not work any graveyard shifts during her 
training period. 
When Sheikh returned from maternity leave, Russele was working 
Patti's previously assigned shifts. Exhibit R-l, Addendum E, had 
Russele scheduled for graveyard shifts for Saturdays and Sundays 
for the rotation of 5-5-90 through 5-25-90. As such, Russele could 
not work these graveyard shifts because she had only been in 
training for a few weeks. 
Center policy dictated that the person who worked the 
afternoon shift on the day the graveyard shift could not be 
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handled, would shift down to the graveyard shift. This was a 
common practice and all employees had been required to do so. 
Sheikh's schedule fcr the Saturdays and Sundays Russele was 
scheduled to work graveyards for the rotational of 5-5-90 to 5-25-
90 was afternoon shift. Pursuant to center policy Sheikh's 
schedule was modified to work the graveyard shifts for the days 
Russele could not. 
By shifting Sheikh to the graveyard shifts for the Saturdays 
and Sundays, a "double back" or "short change,f was created when 
Sheikh was regularly scheduled to work an afternoon shift on the 
Monday following the two graveyard shifts. Though this would have 
only gone on for the three weeks of that rotation, Sheikh's 
supervisor Lisa Shook (Shook) was concerned regarding the double 
back and called Sheikh a few days before Sheikh's scheduled return. 
When Sheikh was told about the schedule change, Sheikh 
expressed no concern about the graveyard shifts and inquired about 
the double back. When Shook offered to allow Sheikh to work three 
graveyard shifts instead of having to work the double back, Sheikh 
declined and said she would work it. Sheikh knew Shook had the 
authority to change schedules but never asked her to do so. The 
use of AJs was not considered by management because Sheikh 
expressed no concern about working the schedule. 
While the Department acknowledged that the schedule was a 
tough one, Sheikh never complained about her schedule, never 
mentioned anxiety, pressure or difficulty and did not ask anyone to 
change the schedule prior to her resignation. Employees testified 
8 
that it was not unreasonable or that they would have worked it if 
required. 
After Sheikh had been back at work a few days, she met with 
Hansen and submitted a letter of resignation (Exhibit R-2, Addendum 
F). The letter of resignation listed an inability to obtain baby 
sitters as the reason for resigning- No mention was made of any 
other reason. Hansen suggested that Sheikh could ask other 
dispatchers to trade shifts with her and that no pre-authorization 
was needed. Instead of doing so, Sheikh did not ask for more time 
off but simply asked if she could have a straight shift which no 
one else (other than managers) had or if she could do a part time 
job share. Neither of these options were available at the center. 
Sheikh never worked any of the double backs but called in sick 
on the Monday following the graveyard shifts or for the graveyard 
shifts. The actual schedule worked as recorded (Exhibit P-l, 
Addendum G) shows she worked less than scheduled for each of the 
three weeks before her resignation was effective. 
After her resignation, Shook and Hansen figured Sheikh would 
call in sick for the graveyards since it was known she did not like 
graveyard shifts and had called in sick for graveyard shifts 
previously. Sheikh did call in sick as expected, but Shook did not 
confront or take adverse action against Sheikh. Sheikh's failure 
to appear required John Kelly to modify his schedule and cancel a 
day off. 
Had Sheikh complained about the schedule either before or 
after her return, something could have been done, but Sheikh never 
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complained and did not ask for her schedule to be changed. Sheikh 
had complained regularly that if she did not like a particular 
schedule she would quit and made the comment to John Kelly after 
her return and before her resignation. Her resignation was no 
surprise to dispatch center employees. 
The three week rotating schedule continued at least through 
March of 1991, some ten months after Sheikh resigned. The schedule 
rotated every three weeks. Two days after Sheikh quit, the 
schedule rotated to the next assigned schedule. Had Sheikh 
remained with the center, she would have eventually worked each of 
the various rotations. 
Sheikh knew the schedule rotated every three weeks. She was 
part of the decision making process to implement it. She knew it 
was normal for the schedule to shift down one line. The typed 
schedule was placed in a notebook for dispatchers to examine. 
Sheikh acknowledged going over the rotational schedule with Hansen 
and that she looked in the notebook upon her return from maternity 
leave. Other than the two graveyard shifts Sheikh was assigned 
because of the training of Russele, the schedule she returned to 
was the same schedule she had been shown in March before she went 
on maternity leave. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The ALJ ruled that based on the totality of facts, Petitioner 
failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination based on 
her pregnancy. Absent a showing that the ALJ erred in this 
conclusion, it is not necessary to address the issue of shifting 
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burdens. The burden does not shift if a party fails to meet the 
initial prima facie burden in presenting the case. 
A party claiming that there is insufficient evidence to 
sustain a decision of an ALJ must first marshall all the evidence 
favoring the ALJ's decision and then show how and why that evidence 
is insufficient to sustain the decision and inferences drawn from 
the evidence. Petitioner has not done so in this case. She has 
argued as an advocate presenting evidence sufficient only to argue 
support for her theory of the case. This court should reject her 
approach because she has not presented the facts found by the ALJ 
and the evidence and testimony that is supportive of those 
findings. She simply focused on what she believes is in the record 
that supports her interpretation of the case. 
If this Court determines that the ALJ was either wrong in his 
ruling on Petitioner's failure to establish a prima facie case or 
that Petitioner has not failed to appropriately marshall evidence# 
there is nonetheless substantial evidence supporting the ALJ's 
decision. This appeal is not for the purpose of determining if 
substantial evidence exists to support Petitioner's claim of 
discrimination, but is to determine whether there is substantial 
evidence to support the findings of the ALJ. 
PPPTT I 
PETITIONER FAILED TO ADDRESS THE 
ALJ'S DETERMINATION THAT SHE HAD 
FAILED TO ESTABLISH A PRIMA FACIE 
CASE 
At the conclusion of trial, the Administrative Law Judge wrote 
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at page 7 of his decision (R.49): 
During the evidentiary hearing it was 
determined that the Charging Party had barely 
managed to make a prima facie case. Upon 
retrospect, and considering the total 
evidence, it is apparent; that the balance must 
shift in favor of determining that the 
employee failed to make a prima facie case in 
this matter . . . 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the charging 
Party, Sandra Sheikh, has failed to establish 
a prima facie case in the claim of 
discrimination by her employer...(Emphasis in 
original). 
The initial issue is set by the Administrative Law Judge and 
the Commission in its Order adopting the Findings and Conclusions 
of the ALJ (R. 152-4, Addendum A). Petitioner never met her prima 
facie test. Therefore, the Petitioner's claim that the ALJ and 
Commission erred in not appropriately applying discrimination and 
constructive discharge burdens is misplaced and not relevant. 
In Love v. RE/MAX OF AM,. 738 F.2d 383, 385 (10th Cir. 1984), 
a Title VII case, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a 
charging party, in order to establish a prima facie case of 
employment discrimination, must show that she (1) engaged in a 
protected activity, (2) was subjected by the employer to adverse 
employment action and (3) a causal link existed between the two. 
The Industrial Commission follows and incorporates federal 
case law as authority because of the joint nature and similarity 
between State and Federal law. The burdens and tests for 
discrimination are applied for both State and Federal claims. 
Petitioner's initial claim was filed under both the Utah Anti-
Discrimination Statute as well as Title VII of the Federal Code. 
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The case numbers for both the Utah Anti-Discrimination Division and 
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission are noted on the 
original Charge of Discrimination (R.l, Addendum H) as well as the 
final Order from the ALJ (R.43A, Addendum A) • The state filing is 
based on Utah Code Ann, § 34-35-6 (1) (a) (i) . This provision 
requires a showing that action taken against or toward an employee 
must be "because of,..pregnancy, childbirth, or pregnancy-related 
conditions.. .n (emphasis added) . The Federal filing is based on 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1) which prohibits discrimination on the basis 
of sex. Under both statutory provisions, Petitioner has failed to 
establish a prima facie case of discrimination based on sex or 
pregnancy. 
Respondent disagrees with Petitioner that there is a shifting 
burden of proof, regardless of how the Court views Petitioner's 
first argument. In Te*ag IteP't Qf CPTnmynity AfWrg v, gvnrflipe, 
450 U.S. 248 (1981), the United States Supreme Court held that the 
ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant 
intentionally discriminated against a petitioner remains at all 
times with the Petitioner. It does not shift to the Respondent. 
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green. 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817 
(1973), cited by Petitioner, holds that to meet the prima facie 
requirement a Petitioner has to present sufficient evidence to 
establish a rebuttable presumption that actions taken were the 
result of ("because of") discriminatory intent. It is not enough 
to meet the first two prongs of the Love test as set forth above. 
Petitioner also has to establish through credible evidence that 
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there is a causal connection between the two prongs and what could 
be inferred as discrimination. 
The Supreme Court in Burdine stated that all the employer 
needed to show to overcome a prima facie case was a legitimate 
reason for the action which could mean nothing more than the action 
being non-discriminatory. A mere inference alone, however, is not 
enough to meet the prima facie test, for a fact finder can 
ultimately decide that the facts supporting the inference is not 
sufficient to meet Petitioner's burden and rule against the 
charging party even if a defendant presents no evidence. 
As correctly held by the ALJ, the determination of whether a 
party has met the prima facie test is determined by weighing the 
overall evidence presented. fi£g: EgtSff vT PAcH Smith ?<??$ C9t, 
856 F.2d 1097 (8th Cir. 1988) . Only if a prima facie case has been 
established and there are sufficient inferences to raise the belief 
that the actions taken were the result of discriminatory intent, 
should the matter proceed. See: Cohen v. Fred Meyer. Inc., €86 
F.2d 793, 796 (9th Cir. 1982). Absent such a showing there is no 
causal link under the third prong of the Love test. Petitioner has 
failed to show this connection. 
Petitioner's entire argument assumes that the ALJ was wrong 
and never addresses the issue that a prima facie case was not met. 
Petitioner admits no direct evidence exists and simply states that 
there are "...numerous examples, including procedural 
irregularities, that cannot be explained outside of discriminatory 
intent..." (Petitioner Brief, p. 18). This simple statement does 
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not meet the prima facie test but is simply argument. 
If this Court questions whether the ALJ correctly ruled, 
Respondent's third argument discusses in great detail the findings 
of the ALJ and the reasons why there is substantial evidence to 
support them. The recitation clearly discloses why the ALJ ruled 
as he did. There was no showing of discriminatory intent. 
Policies were implemented as they were required to be implemented. 
Even with those policies controlling, management gave Petitioner an 
opportunity to change her schedule so that it would be more 
acceptable yet Petitioner expressed no concern and asked for no 
changes. No evidence was presented which even inferred 
inappropriate behavior other than Petitioner's self serving 
statements of what she thought and how she felt. The fact that she 
had never expressed her concerns, feelings, or complaints to 
management and at trial changed her story from one of not being 
able to obtain baby sitters to where baby sitting was no problem 
goes to her credibility. 
It is clear that the ALJ did not believe much of what 
Petitioner stated. Petitioner simply infers there are "numerous 
examples" including "procedural irregularities" which she says can 
not be explained by any other way than "there must have been 
discrimination" in order to justify her claim that the ALJ was 
wrong. There has been no showing what those irregularities are and 
why the ALJ erred in not accepting Petitioner's version. There has 
been no discussion why the ALJ's decision that there was no showing 
of discriminatory intent was error. 
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Petitioner has not met her burden on appeal to establish that 
the ALJ was in error in his conclusion. She has neither marshaled 
the evidence in favor of that ruling nor has she shown why the 
conclusions drawn by the ALJ were inadequate,1 
If this Court determines that the ALJ was in error in regard 
to Petitioner meeting the prima facie test# however, the burden of 
establishing discrimination remains firmly with Petitioner. The 
ALJ specifically held (R.49): 
In any event, assuming that the employee did 
make a prima facie the employer articulated 
legitimate reasons why the Charging Party's 
schedule was difficult and therefore it is 
concluded that the Charging Party cannot 
prevail. 
The Utah Supreme Court in University of Utah v. Industrial 
Commission of Utah, 736 P.2d 630 (Utah 1987) has adopted the 
shifting burden of production, but held that the ultimate burden of 
proving discrimination, under the Utah Anti-Discrimination 
statutes, remains squarely with the Petitioner or one claiming that 
discrimination took place. The court held that even if a 
sufficient inference was raised to establish a prima facie case, 
the employer had to simply supply evidence that "raises a genuine 
issue of fact as to whether it discriminated against appellant" 736 
1
 It must be remembered that Petitioner is solely claiming 
discriminatory action. This is not a constructive discharge (tort) 
case. The only reason the doctrine of constructive discharge 
enters the picture is Petitioner's claim that the action taken is 
"because of" a discriminatory intent which necessitated her 
quitting. The Commission's jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. §§ 
34-35-6(1)(a) (i) and 34-35-7.1 deals with discrimination only, not 
with general theories of employment law. Therefore, absent a 
showing of discrimination, the jurisdiction of the Commission and 
the appellate review authority of this court ends. 
16 
P.2d at 634. -Petitioner would then have to establish that the 
reasons tendered were not legitimate. The ALJ held Petitioner had 
failed to do this even if she had met the prima facie test. 
Under University and Vpit^ fl S t » W Ppst?! gervt Bfl. Pf 
Governors v. Aikens. 460 U.S. 711 (1983) (cited in State v. 
Harrison. 805 P.2d 769# 777 (Utah App. 1991)), Petitioner would 
still need to establish there was no substantial evidence to 
support the findings and conclusion of the ALJ that there was no 
discrimination. The ALJ held that under the totality of evidence, 
Petitioner had not met the burden of proving by a preponderance of 
the evidence that the legitimate reason presented by Respondent was 
a pretext or was really not the reason. She had the obligation to 
establish discriminatory intent. This she also failed to do. 
As a result, the ultimate determination of the case depends on 
the trier of fact's determination of who to believe and whether 
what is believed is credible. The ALJ assessed the witnesses, 
observed their demeanor and analyzed what evidence came forth. The 
evidence presented at trial sustains the ALJ's decision that a 
prima facie case had not been made. A reviewing court does not 
redetermine credibility or reweigh the record evidence, Questar 
Pipeline Co. v. State Tax Comm'n. 850 P.2d 1175, 1178 (Utah 1993) 
or substitute its judgment as between two reasonably conflicting 
inferences that could be drawn from the record evidence, 
Albertsons. Inc. v. Department Enrol. Sec. 854 P.2d 570, 575 (Utah 
App. 1993). 
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POINT II 
PETITIONER'S FAILURE TO MARSHALL 
FAVORABLE EVIDENCE SUPPORTING THE 
ALJ's DECISION AND SHOW HOW IT 
CANNOT BE RELIED ON NECESSITATES 
SUSTAINING THE ALJT.'S DECISION 
Petitioner has failed to adequately disclose and discuss the 
vast evidence and testimony that is supportive of the decision of 
the ALJ. The issue before this Court is whether there is 
substantial evidence to support the findings and decision of the 
ALJ# not whether there is substantial evidence to support 
Petitioner's point of view. It is here where Petitioner has again 
failed to address one of the issues before this Court.. 
In Robb v. Anderton, 863 P.2d 1322# 1328 (Utah App. 1993) # 
this Court held that it will not address a challenge to findings of 
fact unless an appellant has properly marshaled the evidence. 
According to Kennecott Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n. 858 P.2d 1381, 
1385 (Utah 1993), properly marshaling the evidence is a listing of 
the evidence supporting the finding that is challenged. Thereafter, 
the party so challenging the finding must show that despite 
supporting facts and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn 
therefrom, the findings are not supported by substantial evidence 
given the record as a whole. In essence, a party so challenging 
the findings must demonstrate that the findings of fact when viewed 
in the light most favorable to the decision are legally 
insufficient to sustain the finding. See: Stewart v. Board of 
ftevjgw, 831 P.2d 134, 138 (Utah App. 1992); McPherson v. Belnap. 
830 P.2d 302, 305 (Utah App. 1992). 
18 
Petitioner clearly articulated her position as to why she 
believes there is evidence to support her beliefs. That, however 
is not the appropriate standard for thin case. The method 
Petitioner has used to marshall evidence to support her position 
has been rejected by this Court as improper in these cases- See: 
Intermountain Health Care. Inc. v. Board of Review, 839 P.2d 841, 
844 (Utah App. 1992). 
The Court of Appeals discussed what it expects in West Vallev 
Citv v. Maiestic Inv. Co.. 818 P.2d 1311 (Utah App. 1991): 
The marshaling process is not unlike 
becoming the devil's advocate. Counsel must 
extricate himself or herself from the client's 
shoes and fully assume the adversary's 
position. In order to properly discharge the 
duty of marshaling the evidence, the 
challenger must present, in comprehensive and 
fastidious order, every scrap of competent 
evidence introduced at trial which supports 
the very findings the appellant resists-
After constructing this magnificent array of 
supporting evidence, the challenger must 
ferret out a fatal flaw in the evidence. 
818 P.2d 1311 at 1315 (emphasis added). 
This Court will accept the findings of the Commission if there 
has been a failure on the part of the Petitioner to adequately 
marshal the evidence required in such cases. See: Johnson v. 
Board of Review. 842 P.2d 910, 912 (Utah App. 1992). Since 
Petitioner has simply given lip service to the evidence supporting 
the ALJ's findings without presenting supportive evidence in the 
comprehensive and fastidious manner as required by the Court, it is 
appropriate for the court to reject her argument and accept the 
findings as set forth by the ALJ. 
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Petitioner has failed to marshall the evidence as the Court 
has required. This Court should therefore reject Petitioner's 
challenge to the ALJ's finding of no discriminatory purpose on the 
ground that she has failed to identify the areas where the 
supportive evidence relied on by the ALJ is not credible.
 m 
POINT III 
THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE THAT 
SUPPORTS THE FINDING OF THE ALJ THAT 
RESPONDENT DID NOT DISCRIMINATE 
AGAINST SHEIKH BECAUSE OF HER 
PREGNANCY WHEN IT SET THE WORK 
SCHEDULE 
The thrust of Petitioner's argument is that there is 
insufficient evidence to support the findings and conclusions of 
the ALJ. The ALJ, after an extensive evidentiary hearing, 
concluded that he believed^the reasons and explanations set forth 
by the Respondent. 
The ALJ's findings, while numbered, tend to incorporate 
several separate findings within individual paragraphs. They do 
not appear to follow any particular pattern of discussion. Yet, 
the findings do adequately address the issues he found important 
and which adequately support his conclusion of no discrimination. 
Because of the difficulty in separating each finding and 
discussing it individually, Respondent has taken those findings 
from the various paragraphs which have a commonality and will 
discuss them in light of the record and show how the evidence is 
substantial and reliable in support of the findings. 
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1^ Findings 3. 4. and 21: The pppitjpn w?g Btrgggfvl wjt;h 
frequent rotation. It had both positive and negative aspects which 
were known to Sheikh who acknowledged so wh<*n she signed the 
flepartmept'g jqfppp^tlgnal sheet, 
It was common practice for employees to have lousy schedules. 
Exhibit P-l# R.201-218# shows exactly how everyone's schedule 
changed, dating from September 30# 1989 to when Sheikh resigned. 
Shook testified that she didn't believe that she ever prepared a 
schedule that people liked (R.667). 
Sheikh was aware of this fact and signed a Radio Dispatcher 
Information sheet which contained the requirements of the position 
(Exhibit R-4, R.381-3# Addendum C) . This document listed positives 
and negatives of the job including the need to work myriads of 
schedules, not being able to take breaks, having to go to work on 
short notice, having to obtain child care at one hour's notice any 
time of day or night, not being able to choose days off or shifts 
among other things. The ALJ's recitation of finding #3 basically 
summarizes this document. All the evidence elicited at trial 
basically sustained the requirements contained in Exhibit R-4. 
Sheikh testified that she had seen the document, read it, 
signed it and*even underlined the certification above her signature 
on page 3 of the document (R.383) which says "considered each 
factor listed" (R.545-8) . She acknowledged being told that she had 
to work split shifts, varying shifts, had to get child care at an 
hours notice and that she was told nothing new (R.547). 
The position was very stressful to all employees (R.440) and 
made life difficult for outside activities and social life because 
of the various changing schedules (R.440). Sheikh was familiar 
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with these requirements and she knew what was expected of her 
(R.548). She had worked as a dispatcher for many years. 
Double backs were worked commonly by individuals at the 
center. From January 1990 until when Sheikh returned to work, 
Sheikh was the only employee who had worked no double backs at all 
(R.468-9) while others worked the following double backs: Lisa -
2, Marty - 4, Patti - 1# John - 1, Diane - 2, and Leah - 4 (R.468) . 
Sheikh was scheduled to work three double backs for the three 
weeks following her return because of the policy that the person 
having the afternoon shift would work the graveyard shift ifi the 
assigned person could not work it (R.476, 552, 645, 676). Even 
with the three double backs scheduled Sheikh worked none of them 
(Exhibit P-l, pp R.217-18, Addendum G, R.469, 660). 
Petitioner was not the only one with a lousy schedule and in 
fact everyone at the center had constantly changing schedules. 
Other workers had more double backs than Sheikh and worked them. 
Sheikh knew the requirements of the job, accepted the positive and 
negative aspects of the job and was scheduled pursuant to policy. 
That policy was not established just for her, but was a long 
standing policy. The fact that the entire center operation created 
stress in employees' lives was something everyone lived with. 
Stress was not created by the schedule Sheikh returned to. 
The ALJ was correct in stating in Finding 21 that there was 
absolutely no evidence that the policy on schedules, variation, 
baby sitting, etc. (known since 1969 and accepted by Sheikh) was 
applied toward her in a discriminatory manner. There was further 
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no evidence that this policy was applied in a discriminatory 
pattern toward anyone as will be seen from the discussion that 
continues. 
Shifting schedules, the difficulty of lifestyle and the 
problems created to one's social life and routine were common place 
with those who worked at the center. There was nothing unique to 
Sheikh in this regard. The evidence shows that Petitioner was not 
doing anything different from other center dispatchers, 
1*. Finding 6: Purina a normal week, there were often daily 
chances to the planned schedule due to sickness, vacation or 
ypexpeptqfl emergencies Pf th<?p? scheduled t<? wppHt 
There is no question that schedules didn't always work the way 
they were planned (R.622). A normal schedule would be as typed up 
(R.443) . If no one requested time off, called in sick, or if 
employees were never off other than scheduled days off the schedule 
would work just as planned (R.443-4)• Hansen testified that there 
might be one normal week all year because of the need to make 
changes (R.444). That certainly does not mean every time a pre-
planned schedule didn't work it was because of discrimination. 
Such a claim would be absurd. Every dispatcher had worked for 
others who were sick or otherwise not able to meet their schedules 
with personal emergencies. 
Exhibit P-l, R.201-218, clearly shows numerous individuals who 
were sick or otherwise took vacation. Sometimes AJs were used. 
Other times regular staff were used to fill in. The department 
never claimed that schedules didn't change - in fact it openly 
acknowledged they did. 
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A case in point is that of Petitioner Sheikh. Sheikh was 
scheduled for an afternoon shift on Monday, May 7, 1990 (Exhibit R-
1, R.378, Addendum E) when she returned to work. She called in 
sick and another employee, John Kelly was called in on his day off 
to take her place (Exhibit P-l, R.217-18, Addendum G, R.470, 557, 
657) . In that sense, it was not possible to tell John Kelly ahead 
of time exactly what schedule he would be working. Nonetheless, 
John was given a particular schedule for the week (Exhibit R-l, 
R.378, Addendum E) . Had Sheikh not called in sick, Kelly would 
have worked the schedule as planned and taken his day off. 
This is different from the rotational schedule. That was 
preplanned, approved and was in place. The normal schedule would 
rotate so that planned days off and shifts to work would be known 
ahead of time and specific days worked would be subject to 
intervening incidents that would happen after the schedule was 
prepared (R.622). Shook followed the master schedule as much as 
possible but made changes as necessary depending on the staffing 
needs when employees took time off (R.642). 
3. Findings 6. 10 and 20: Fixed schedules and a two week 
rotational schedule were not liked and created problems. After 
dispatchers complained a new three week rotational schedule was 
proposed and implemented. Sheikh knew of the new rotational scheme 
and knew it would rotate and that she wouldn't have to work her 
return schedule indefinitely. 
At one time after the consolidation, the schedule was a 
straight shift schedule which allowed employees to work the same 
shift consistently (R.541). Such straight schedules went by 
seniority (R.541) which turned out to be less than satisfactory for 
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those with less seniority were unhappy with the least desirable 
shifts (R.542). 
After employees complained, a two week rotational schedule was 
adopted (R.554) which allowed each employee to work the same 
schedule of shifts for two weeks before rotating to a different set 
of shifts (R.530-1). 
Employees again complained about the two week rotational 
schedule in that it was too soon to rotate and did not give enough 
time to adjust to one schedule before shifting to another (R.455). 
The two week rotational schedule included what was called a "double 
back" or "short change" which was working a second shift with only 
8 or 9 hours between shifts (R.420, 425, 467). 
After the employees complained of the two week rotational 
being too burdensome, John Kelly prepared a suggested three week 
rotational schedule (Exhibit P-5, R.279, Addendum D). Hansen 
presented it to center employees for input, including Sheikh, in 
February 1990, and it was adopted to be effective March 3, 1990 
(Exhibit P-5, R.276-7, Addendum D) . Sheikh was part of the 
discussion process of implementing the three week rotational prior 
to her leaving on maternity leave (R.456) and never complained 
about the schedule (R.456, 684). 
Hansen even sat down with Sheikh before Sheikh went on 
maternity leave and used the three week rotational schedule that 
had been preplanned (Exhibit R-l, R.378, Addendum E) and projected 
the preplanned schedule Sheikh would return to in May (R.554). 
This projection was based on the schedules that shifted one line 
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down every three weeks - the very one relied on by Sheikh for the 
schedule she was supposed to return to. Sheikh knew from 
experience that the projected schedule (she had been on straight 
shift, two week rotational shifts, and now three week rotational 
shifts for years) was just that, a projected schedule subject to 
change because of intervening events (R.622). There was no 
testimony or indication that the three week rotational schedule 
would ever end (R.589) or that any one schedule would continue 
indefinitely. 
Sheikh acknowledged that the schedule she was shown before 
going on maternity was in force at the time she returned to work 
(R.572). Sheikh admitted going to the notebook kept in the center 
for dispatcher's use to see if the schedule was still in force when 
she returned to work (R.556). She testified that after looking in 
the notebook that the schedule was "obviously a rotating schedule" 
(R.556). Sheikh stated that she knew the schedule wasn't a fixed 
schedule because she "new better" (R.557). She further admitted 
that the schedule she returned to was the exact schedule she had 
planned on returning to except for the two graveyard shifts she was 
asked to work each week because of the training of Russele (R.572) . 
Sheikh acknowledged that she had seen Exhibit R-l (R.378, 
Addendum E) which was in the book at the time she returned to work 
which covered three three-week schedule changes beginning on 5-5-90 
and ending 7-6-90 (R.378). 
The ALJ in Finding 20 was correct in his conclusion that 
Sheikh knew the schedule was rotating. He rejected Sheik's claim 
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that she had no knowledge or expectation that the schedule would 
change. The purpose of preparing Exhibit R-l was so that employees 
would know the planned schedules ahead of time (R.463). Sheikh 
knew the schedule rotated every three weeks beginning in March 1990 
(R.521) and that it was the normal procedure for the schedule to 
shift down every three wefeks so that everyone would shift to a 
different schedule at the same time (R.553). 
The rotating schedule, Exhibit R-l, (R.378, Addendum E) 
continued through at least March 1991 (R.605) , over a year after it 
was first implemented and eleven months after Sheikh resigned. 
There is overwhelming evidence she knew her schedule would change. 
Sheikh argues that there was never an explanation from 
Respondent why no one from 1989 to 1990 ever had such a schedule as 
she. Clearly the three week rotational schedule was implemented 
effective the first of March 1990. It had only been in existence 
for two months when Sheikh returned to work. That would mean that 
when she returned to work the schedule was going into its fourth 
rotation (each rotation was three weeks). It is certainly not 
discriminatory for someone to have a schedule that no one else had 
ever had when the rotational had only been in existence for a few 
weeks and unique circumstances necessitated changes. Because 
Sheikh had been on maternity leave, she had not worked any of the 
rotational shifts under the newly adopted plan. 
Petitioner's Brief makes an interesting statement at Page 32 
wherein is said: "Sheikh alone...was given a schedule that no one 
had ever been given before and no one was given at least for the 
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first week following sheikh's termination,.." (emphasis added). Of 
course no one had it before March 1990 because the same rotational 
schedule did not exist and provide for such a possibility. And of 
course no one had it in the 9 weeks preceding her return because 
the circumstances had not repeated themselves. 
Exhibit P-5 (R.276-7# Addendum D) shows the existence of seven 
separate schedules that would rotate every three weeks. 
Eventually, the rotation would be complete after 21 weeks. This 
means that each employee who stayed with the department would be 
scheduled for each preplanned schedule approximately every 21 v^ eeks 
before that dispatcher would repeat the entire rotation. 
With Patti quitting when she did and Sandra off work having a 
baby, it would be difficult to see how the same set of 
circumstances would exist again any time soon. It becomes simply 
a stretch of imagination to argue that because no one else had the 
same problems through this new rotational schedule that somehow 
management "planned11 to discriminate against her. To come to that 
conclusion, one would have to ignore all the other evidence that 
exists and which the ALJ soundly considered. 
A*. Ftotoq? Si 91 91 ar*3 14; The ?ris$ fligpgtcfr center w^s 
inadequately staffed which created problems when employees were 
unable to fill their shifts. Temporary employees could not be used 
until full time employees were first used. Sheikh expressed no 
concern about the schedule and accepted it. 
The ALJ specifically found that the Price dispatch center was 
not adequately staffed and there was difficulty scheduling if 
people took time off. This is certainly confirmed by Nancy Hansen# 
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the center director, Lisa Shook, Sheikh's supervisor and Carol 
Groustra, the state director over all centers (R.549-51, €39, 670). 
Part time employees known as AJs could be used (R.448), but 
there were restraints placed on their usage. There was no separate 
budget for them (R.671). Even Sheikh acknowledged knowing that 
there were restrictions, but didn't know the specifics (R.560-1). 
The center had to work with what it had (R.452) and could use 
AJs only when absolutely necessary (R.452). Department policy 
dictated that temporaries could not be used until full time staff 
had first been used or were unable to cover shifts (R.452, 630, 
646, 657) . Shook had to determine whether current staff could meet 
the schedule. 
Shook called Sheikh before Sheikh's return to talk with her 
about the schedule. Sheikh expressed some concern about the double 
back (R.647) but did not request any change (R.647) . She was even 
offered the option of working three graveyard shifts in a rovj 
instead of two graveyards with the double back. Sheikh simply said 
"no that's ok" (R.648). 
Temporaries were not brought in because Sheikh expressed no 
problem with being able to handle the schedule (R.609). Shook 
simply applied the policy of seeing if current staff could handle 
the situation, asked Sheikh about it, was told Sheikh would handle 
it and did nothing more about it. 
It is not discrimination and no inference can be raised that 
it is discrimination when a policy that is longstanding and is not 
directed to any segment or class is used to solve a scheduling 
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problem. The policy existed before Sheikh was pregnant and was not 
implemented or used just because she was pregnant. 
Sheikh never complained to Shook (R.692) and never requested 
modification of her schedule (R.692) even though she knew that 
Shook had the authority to change the schedule (R.692). Sheikh 
further never complained about her schedule to Hansen or Carol 
Groustra, the State Coordinator for dispatch centers from her 
return to work until the day of her resignation (R-594, 631, 649# 
676) . There is no evidence that she asked for AJs to be used. The 
use of AJs was never considered because there was no indication by 
Sheikh as to her desire to have some help (R.609). 
The fact that Sheikh was approached ahead of time, had the 
opportunity to request changes and didn't cries for a rejection of 
her claims. The normal policy of seeing if current staff could 
handle a particular problem was implemented. Sheikh was asked if 
she could perform the service and she agreed to do it. Had she 
expressed a concern, something could have been done about it 
(R.630). Shook testified that had the issue been raised, a change 
would have been made (R.668). 
5. Findings 6 and 12; New hire trainees created scheduling 
problems in that thev could not work graveyard shifts alone. This 
required the implementation of center policy to etfift the afternoon 
schedule to work the cravevard shift. 
It was the longstanding policy of the department to move 
afternoon shift employees to the graveyard shift if it was not 
possible for the assigned employee to fill the graveyard shift. It 
is that simple. There was no gerrymandering or concoction of a new 
procedure or policy targeted at Sheikh. To even argue such would 
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be dishonest. This itself sustains the ALJ's rejection of Sheikh's 
claim and ruled there was not even an inference of discrimination. 
It is not only a legitimate nondiscriminatory business reason for 
the action but was ground enough to rule that Petitioner had not 
met her burden of presenting a prima facie case. 
While Sheikh was on maternity leave, Patti, another full time 
dispatcher, quit her job (R.471) . Sheikh knew that Patti was 
intending to quit but did nothing to determine how that might 
affect her return schedule (R.548) . With Patti quitting and Sheikh 
on maternity leave, the center was down two permanent employees 
.(R.466) . Patti was assigned to work the schedule immediately above 
Sheikh's on the scheduling sheets provided to employees and placed 
in the notebook for dispatchers to see (Exhibit R-l, R.378, 
Addendum E) . Had Patti not quit, she would have worked the 
schedule so indicated on that Exhibit when Sheikh returned to work 
(R.378). 
The center hired a new dispatcher, Russele, to replace Patti 
(R.471). Russele was assigned to work Patti's schedule (Exhibit R-
1, R.378, Addendum E) . Russele began working mid April and when 
Sheikh returned, Russele was in training for the dispatcher 
position (R.432)• 
It was department policy that a new trainee could not work a 
graveyard shift alone (R.465, 673-4, 688) since that new employee 
did not have the experience necessary to be alone. As such, 
Russele could not work graveyard shift during her training period 
since she would be alone (R.465). Normally the training period was 
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anywhere from £-8 weeks (R.411-12). The bulk of the training for 
the position consisted of working alongside experienced dispatchers 
(R.411). 
Exhibit R-l (R.378# Addendum E) shows that for the weeks that 
Sheikh was scheduled to return, Russele's (Patti's former) schedule 
called for Saturdays and Sundays to be graveyard shifts. As 
stated, Russele was in training and could not work the two 
graveyard shifts (R.472). Exhibit R-l (R.378, Addendum E) also 
shows that on May 26# 1990 and June 16, when the schedule rotated 
down to the next lines for the next two rotations (R.625-6), 
Russele had no graveyard shifts scheduled and could work regular 
shifts with another experienced employee. 
With Russele not being able to work graveyard shifts, Shook 
was required to fill the graveyard shifts since the 24 hour service 
center could not go without dispatchers (R.439-40). 
As discussed above, the center did have some capacity to use 
AJs (R.452), but department policy mandated that AJs could not be 
used until full time staff had first been used or were unable to 
cover shifts (R.452, 630, 646, 657). Shook asked Sheikh about the 
double back and the modified schedule with no concern being 
expressed about working them (R.648). Shook did not schedule any 
AJs since Sheikh expressed no problem with being able to handle the 
modified schedule (R.609). 
Shook therefore invoked center policy again to determine how 
to staff the graveyard shifts which Russele could not fill. Center 
and department policy was that if a person could not work the 
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graveyard shift, for whatever reason (annual leave, sick leave, 
training, emergency, etc,) the person who worked the afternoon or 
3:00 p.m. to 11:00 p.m. shift would be moved to the graveyard shift 
(R.476, 552, 645, 676). Sheikh testified that she was familiar 
with the policy and that the practice was to shift that person to 
graveyard (R.552-3). She herself had been, required to shift down 
before taking maternity leave (R.476). Everyone at the center had 
been obligated to shift from afternoon to graveyard at some point 
of time (R.476, 645). Sheikh had never been heard to complain of 
that policy (R.685). 
According to Exhibit R-l (R.378, Addendum E) , the schedule 
Sheikh was scheduled to return to before leaving on maternity leave 
(R.553) consisted of Sheikh working afternoon shifts for Saturdays, 
Sundays and Mondays. Russele was scheduled to work graveyard on 
Saturdays and Sundays. 
Shook 6imply invoked the long standing policy and shifted the 
afternoon shift to the graveyard shift (R.476, 655). The only 
reason the schedule was changed was to meet the needs of the 
trainee who could not work graveyard alone (R.602, 614) . There has 
never been any allegation that the policy was not followed 
appropriately or that management purposely got Patti to quit so 
that a "tough" schedule would be given to Sheikh. Petitioner 
simply argues that even though the policy was appropriately 
implemented that it was discriminatory. Such an argument has no 
substance. 
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Sheikh testified that she was aware that she was scheduled for 
afternoon and cnat pursuant to policy she was shifted down (R.560) . 
From this recitation of evidence and testimony, it is clear 
that Sheikh was not singled out and that the schedule was not 
prepared to target her because she had been pregnant• Sheikh's own 
admissions acknowledge that the policy invoked by Shook was in deed 
the very policy that controlled and that her shifting down was 
nothing more than the invocation of the policy in her case. That 
does not create any discrimination or inference of discrimination. 
The entire argument that it somehow does lacks for logic and reason 
and supports the findings of the ALJ that the Department simply did 
what its policy required and which Sheikh knew about. 
6. Findings 7. 12, 13. 14, 15. 17 and 18: Sheikh was 
generally dissatisfied with her position. Sheikh was contacted 
prior to her return and given an opportunity to have her schedule 
Cfranqefl. She chose not to request a chance, didn't complain until 
the date of her resignation, and, having the ability to do so. made 
pp jffprt to rectify what pftg ppw glajms wag »n untfflrt>JLg 
pituatiQxi. The g?hed\4e w?s n?t SP riqprpvs ptterg *QVI$ not frftve 
worKefl j t i 
After the county system consolidated with the State system, 
Sheikh was never happy (R.685). She preferred to work afternoon 
shifts (3:00 p.m. to 11:00 p.m.) instead of other shifts (R.457, 
521) • She didn't want to work a rotating schedule at all (R.630) . 
She complained regularly before going on maternity leave about 
schedules (R.684) and told others that if she didn't like a 
particular shift, she'd quit (R.684). It was no different after 
she returned from maternity leave (R.685). She continued to be 
unhappy there and it was no surprise to center dispatchers that she 
quit (R.685). 
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By following the policy of shifting Sheikh from afternoon to 
graveyard# a double back or a short change between the Sunday 
graveyard shift and the Monday afternoon shift was created (Exhibit 
R-l, R.378, Addendum E) . The double back would have lasted for 
only three weeks because the schedule rotated down one line two 
days after Sheikh quit. Russele had no graveyard shifts for the 
next two rotations. Sheikh would have basically had day shifts 
during the next rotational period of time (R.455) had she stayed. 
For this three week period, however, a difficult schedule was 
assigned to Sheikh (R.600). If John Kelly's name had been where 
Sheikh's name was, he would have been assigned to work the schedule 
instead of Sheikh (R.628)• 
Kelly testified that he would not have been surprised to be 
assigned such a schedule (R.689), that it would have been no 
surprise to have worked two graveyard with a double back the third 
day (R.689). He stated: "That would be normal for the 
circumstances" (R.689). Even though he wouldn't have liked it, he 
would have worked it (R.689). 
While Sheikh testified that she didn't believe that anyone 
could work that schedule (R.690), such was purely speculation and 
Shook, her supervisor testified that she could not say for certain 
that no one had never worked that type of schedule (R.667) . Hansen 
testified that the schedule was not unreasonable under the 
circumstances (R.600) and that she believed a reasonable person 
would have worked it (R.601). 
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Because the double back was created
 # Shook knew there might be 
concern regarding that schedule (R.663) which the Department 
admitted was a difficult schedule (R.600)• As such, Shook called 
Sheikh a few days before her scheduled return to tell her of the 
shift change necessitated by# Russele's training (R.646) which 
reason Sheikh openly acknowledged was told her at that time 
(R.566) . As noted before, Shook testified that Sheikh expressed no 
concern about the graveyard shift change (R.646), inquired about 
the double back (R.647), but did not ask the double back be 
alleviated or modified (R.647). 
Shook even offered to allow Sheikh to work three graveyard 
shifts in a row (Saturday, Sunday, and Monday), thereby changing 
her Monday afternoon shift to do away with the double back, but 
Sheikh simply said wno that's ok" (R.648). This offer would have 
provided three graveyard shifts, two days off, then two morning 
shifts (Exhibit R-l, R.378, Addendum E) . Sheikh testified that she 
knew that Shook had authority to change the schedule (R.692), but 
openly admitted that she did not ask Shook to do so (R.692). 
As to the schedule itself, Sheikh acknowledged that other than 
the two graveyard shifts she was assigned to work pursuant to 
policy, the other three shifts were exactly the davs she was 
scheduled to work as part of her regularly assigned rotation 
schedule (R.568). She stated that the entire schedule did not 
change, only the Saturday and Sunday shifts (R.579). 
Additionally, Sheikh never made her concerns known (if she had 
any) to Shook or Hansen until the day she resigned, May 10, 1990 
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(R.531) • Shook was not aware of any problems or concerns until 
after the resignation when Hansen told her of the resignation 
(R.660). 
When Sheikh expressed concern about the difficulty in getting 
baby sitters (R.490)f Hansen told her that she could trade shifts 
with other dispatchers (R.495) which Sheikh had done before 
(R.596). Hansen's permission to do so wasn't even needed (R.495). 
Sheikh presented no testimony that she had even tried this route. 
Sheikh asked for straight shifts (something no other non 
manager dispatcher had) but was told that was not possible (R.,491-
2, 595) . The only individuals who had straight shifts were Hansen, 
the center manager and day supervisor and Shook who was the 
afternoon supervisor (R.426, 448, 637). Sheikh further asked if 
there was the possibility to job share with someone else (this 
would have been less than a full time job) but was told such was 
not available in the centers (R.490-1, 675). Sheikh also did not 
ask for more time off (R.492, 557). 
Both Hansen and Shook testified that had Sheikh raised her 
concerns about the schedule or the double back something could have 
been done (R.630, 668). A modification could have been made 
(R.631-2, 648), but Sheikh never complained or requested a change 
(R.631, 563). Carol Groustra, the State manager over all dispatch 
centers, who knew Sheikh, also testified that Sheikh never called 
her to complain or ask for modification (R.676). No AJs were 
scheduled because Sheikh expressed no concern with handling the 
schedule (R.609). 
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When she resigned, she had not complained of the schedule to 
any of her superiors (R.594, 649, 676), never asked for a change to 
the schedule (R.630, 653) and never mentioned anything regarding 
pressure, anxiety, tension or concerns regarding safety of those 
she serviced (R.453, 597). 
Sheikh had opportunity to change the schedule, kept quiet and 
admittedly did not ask Shook, the person in charge of making the 
schedule and who had called her with the changes, to make any 
changes. While management realized the difficulty of the schedule, 
contact was made, explanations as to the reasons for the schedule 
were given and Sheikh was given the opportunity to request changes 
in the schedule. This she did not do. 
These actions are consistent with good management. Simply 
because a difficult schedule is dictated by policy and 
circumstances does not indicate or infer discrimination. Sheikh 
was a good dispatcher (R.664) and had satisfactory appraisals 
(R.436-38). It made good sense and appropriate management policy 
to check with Sheikh to see what effect the schedule change would 
have on her and whether she had any concern. If an employee 
expresses no concern or complaint and requests no modification, 
management should not be expected to further complicate an already 
complicated matter without reason. Sheikh rejected every offer to 
modify the schedule. 
The things Sheikh requested (job share or straight shift) went 
to Sheikh's ability to obtain baby sitters and were not addressed 
at the difficulty of her return schedule (Exhibit R-2, R.379, 
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Addendum F, and testimony at R.489-90). Sheikh further testified 
that she wasn't able to spend enough time with her young baby 
(R.558). At trial she then contradicted herself and claimed that 
it was the terrible schedule and that baby sitting was not a 
problem because of her mother and husband (R.557-8). Such 
testimony was not credible'and was rejected by the ALJ. 
2Lu Finding 19 and 20: Sheikh would have rotated out of the 
schedule she did not like three weeks after she returned to work 
and would have eventually rotated through all schedules, gfrg fagw 
the schedule would rotate. 
Two days after Sheikh resigned, the schedule shifted to the 
next rotation (R.605) and had she not resigned, she would have 
worked in the next rotation which contained no double backs, no 
graveyards and was pretty much straight days (Exhibit R-l, R.378, 
Addendum E, R.473-4). A review of Russele#s new schedule two days 
after Sheikh resigned, shows that Russele was not scheduled for any 
graveyard shifts and therefore there was no need to shift anyone to 
those shifts to cover for her (Exhibit R-l, R.378, Addendum E) • 
Testimony elicited at trial indicated clearly that if Sheikh had 
stayed with the center, she would have eventually worked all of the 
various schedules just as everyone else would have also shifted 
through all of the various schedules (R.406, 683). 
Sheikh had participated in the formulation of the three week 
rotational policy and was personally aware it rotated every three 
weeks (R.486, 521, 581). She had been a dispatcher for ten years 
(R.513) and had worked all sorts of schedules over that period of 
time. Sheikh acknowledged that before she went on maternity leave 
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she knew the schedule rotated every three weeks (R.554) and that 
Hansen had gone over the rotating schedule with her (R.553). 
When Sheikh returned she even looked in the notebook in the 
center and testified that it was wobviously a rotating schedule" 
(R.556). She further knew she wasn't on a fixed rotating schedule 
which would never change because she "knew better11 (R.557) . Sheikh 
further testified that even though no one told her specifically 
upon her return that the schedule would rotate down, she did not 
count down three weeks to see where she would be (R.555) and never 
asked anyone if the schedule would change (R.555-6). Sheikh 
acknowledged that the schedule she came back to was in fact the 
schedule she was originally told (through rotation) except for the 
two graveyard shifts that she worked because of Russele's training 
(R.572) . 
Neither of Sheikh's supervisors should have been required to 
tell her the shift changed, particularly since Sheikh never 
indicated to either of her supervisors that the reason she quit was 
because of the schedule - only the inability to get baby sitters. 
The schedule Sheikh complained about was temporary in nature 
and pursuant .to policy would have shifted automatically. 
&*. Findings 16 and 18: Sheikh did not work any of the 
schedule complained of, did not work anv of the short chances and 
took herself out of the problem through using measures available to 
her. 
Sheikh never worked any double backs she complains so 
vigorously about (R.469# 501f €60). As seen on Exhibit P-l, (pp. 
R.217-218, Addendum G), the first Monday back after the two 
graveyard shifts were not worked. This is seen by the W-7 (7 hours 
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leave without pay) and 1-V (1 hour annual leave). Thus# no double 
back or short change was worked by Sheikh. For the next two sets 
of Saturdays and Sundays she called in sick as designated as "sick" 
or W meaning off without pay. 
After the resignation, Shook and Hansen figured that Sheikh 
would not show up for the graveyard shifts remaining (R.408# €59) . 
Whenever she was so scheduled, she called in sick (R.659) . It was 
known that Sheikh had done the same thing when she had been 
scheduled for some graveyard shifts earlier (R.659). She had 
called in sick frequently (R.664) and Sheikh's co-workers had 
complained a lot about her calling in sick (R.665). Therefore, it 
was not unreasonable for the ALJ to disbelieve Sheikh by stating in 
his findings that she was not ill. 
While Sheikh claimed illness, her supervisors doubting that 
fact, never confronted Sheikh about it because she had already 
given her notice of resignation (R.660). 
Because Sheikh called in sick she only worked four days the 
first week back, three days the second week back, and only two days 
the last week back (Exhibit P-l, pp. R.217-18, Addendum G) . Other 
than the first two graveyard shifts she worked under the modified 
schedule for Russele, every shift she worked the remainder of the 
time she was with the Department was a day that she was told in 
March (before she left on maternity leave) she would work when she 
returned (See: Exhibit R-l, R.378, Addendum E, and Exhibit P-l, pp. 
R.217-18, Addendum 6). Sheikh so acknowledged as she testified 
(R.567). 
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Sheikh did what she had done before - took time off. In 
essence she never "had to" and never "did" work the schedule 
complained about. She was not questioned or confronted about her 
actions. Even if it could be .believed that the schedule was 
intentionally planned toward Sheikh, Sheikh had it in her own power 
to ameliorate the schedule. She could call in sick (like she had 
done before), she could trade with other dispatchers (which she 
knew about), or she could have asked Shook for a change in schedule 
to help her out (which she knew she could do). While she neither 
traded shifts nor requested a modification in schedule, she did 
call in sick and provided a way to temporarily overcome the 
problems with what she now says was an intolerable schedule. 
Sheikh and Hansen never even questioned her calling in and there is 
no evidence that any negative action was planned or taken. 
Being scheduled to work a schedule without any recourse or 
opportunity to change the circumstances is one thing. To accept a 
schedule without making any attempt to modify it when opportunities 
to do so were available is another thing. Here, Sheikh took 
advantage of options available that were over and above those 
offered to remove herself from the schedule she now complains 
about. The ALJ was absolutely correct in his findings and 
conclusions that she neither worked the double backs but also 
removed herself from the situation causing her concern. That is 
not discrimination and any claim of such should be rejected and the 
conclusions of the ALJ sustained. 
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ORAL ARSUMENT/PUBLICATION OP OPINION 
Oral argument is not requested because Respondent does not 
believe it necessary in this case. A published opinion is also not 
requested because the nature of the case does not deem it 
necessary* 
CPNCWBIMT 
As has been stated, there is not only substantial evidence, 
but overwhelming evidence to support each of the findings and 
conclusions of the ALJ as well as the legitimate inferences that 
can be drawn from them. Petitioner has not marshaled the evidence. 
The implementation of clear and longstanding policies to solve 
temporary staffing problems is a legitimate, nondiscriminatory 
practice. The ALJ was correct in the conclusion he made that there 
was no discriminatory intent and properly rejected Petitioner's 
argument. 
Petitioner has simply argued her position as an advocate as if 
this matter was still at the trial level. She has pointed out what 
she believes is evidence supporting her position without marshaling 
and analyzing the evidence supportive of the ALJ's decision. It is 
clear that Petitioner failed to meet her prima facie burden, for 
taken as a whole, there was neither discrimination nor even an 
inference of discrimination. 
This Court should reject in total her argument and sustain the 
Decision of the Administrative Law Judge and the Industrial 
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Commission. This Court should award costs and attorneys fees to 
the State for having to defend this matter on appeal. 
DATED this z S ^ day of April, 1995. 
JTEPHEN~B7HSCHWENDXMft» 
Assistant Attorney General 
Counsel for Respondent 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed two copies of the foregoing 
Brief of Respondents this .SV^day of April 1994 to Counsel for 
Petitioner, Suzanne West, 3269 South Main Street, #270, Salt Lake 
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ADDENDUM A 
Administrative Law Judge Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Order, September 9, 
1993 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
Case No. UADD NO. 90-0467 
EEOC NO. 35C-90-0413 
SANDRA SHEIKH, 
Charging Party, 
vs. 
8TATE OF UTAH / UTAH 
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC 
Respondent. 
* * * * i : * * * * 
SAFETY, 
r * * * * 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
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* 
* 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND ORDER 
HEARING: Hearing Room 332, Industrial Commission of Utah, 
160 East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah on August 
27, 1993, at 8:30 o'clock a.m. Said hearing 
pursuant to Order and Notice of the Commission. 
BEFORE: Benjamin A.^  Sims, Administrative Lav Judge. 
APPEARANCES: The Charging Party, Sandra Sheikh, was present and 
represented by Suzanne West, Attorney at Lav. 
The respondent employer, State of Utah Department 
of Public Safety, was represented by Stephen 6. 
Schvendiman, Assistant Attorney General. 
This case involves a claim of sex discrimination because of 
pregnancy and maternity leave and the Charging Party requests that 
she be reinstated to her position, that she receive back pay from 
the claimed time of constructive discharge at a salary level bi-
weekly of $638.40 plus 10% interest per year on the salary, and in 
addition, reasonable attorney's fees. 
FINDINGS OF FACT: 
1. The Charging Party, Sandra Sheikh, was earning $638.40 bi-
weekly, and was receiving state paid employee benefits in the 
amount of $186.36 bi-weekly. 
2. The Charging Party had been given credit for working for 
the state government (Department of Public Safety) of approximately 
ten and one-half years at the time of alleged constructive 
discharge. 
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3. While there are positive aspects to the radio dispatcher 
position which was held .by the Charging Party, the negative aspects 
of the position were shown to be, among others, that it was an 
extremely stressful position requiring frequent rotation into 
different shifts including graveyard, and what are called ••short 
change" shifts. There are no more than eight hours rest between 
such "short change" shifts. In addition, the evidence shows that 
a dispatcher may not be able to leave his/her worksite without 
proper coverage; may be unable to schedule his/her own breaks; may 
have limited opportunity to socialize with co-workers during 
his/her work shift; may be required to work any of three shifts or 
cover shifts on short notice; may be required to work weekends on 
a regular basis; may be unable to choose the days off or shifts; 
may have to work split days off during a work week; may have to 
procure child care at one hour's notice anytime £ay or night; may 
have to get child care for weekends, holidays, and the middle of 
the night on a regular basis; may have to be prepared to work 
immediately when his/her shift begins; and may have to cancel days 
off or holiday plans on short notice. Also among other 
requirements, may have to handle life threatening emergency 
situations on the radio involving police and other people while 
maintaining a calm professional demeanor; must answer and respond 
to calls for ambulance or paramedics and be able to help the person 
by giving instructions. 
4. On October 26, 1989, the Charging Party acknowledged by 
signature that she had read and considered three pages of factors 
such as those heretofore mentioned. 
5. Prior to the consolidation of county and state dispatch 
functions in 1988, the Charging Party worked for the county 
sheriff's office. In 1988, after the consolidation of services, 
various dispatch organizations were combined into a state 
organization under the Utah Department of Public Safety. 
6. After consolidation, a fixed schedule for dispatchers was 
attempted based on seniority. The Charging Party probably had the 
most or the second most seniority. The fixed system of scheduling 
was changed because junior employees never got weekends off, and 
were often relegated to working graveyard shifts. During a normal 
week, there were often daily changes to the schedule due to 
sickness and other requirements, such as vacation, compensatory 
time and unexpected emergencies in the staff's personal life. When 
a member of the shift called in sick, another member was normally 
asked to come in. The routine to cover the unscheduled events was 
that an earlier shift would be transferred to the later shift. For 
example, the 3 p.m. to 11:00 p.m. shift would be transferred to the 
11:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m. shift in the event the 3:00 p.m. to 11:00 
p.m. shift was unable to come to work. 
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7. Lisa Shook and .Nancy Allred worked fixed shifts only since 
-they were supervisory personnel. 
8. if money was available within certain personnel 
constraints, part-timers known as "A.J." personnel could be used to 
cover the shifts, but only if full-time personnel were first used. 
9. The evidence shows that the Price dispatch office had 
little or no personnel resource slack and in the event that one or 
more people called in unavailable for duty there was a scheduling 
problem created. 
10. The Charging Party became pregnant sometime in 1989 and 
her delivery date was established as March 8,,1990. She duly 
requested maternity leave and Lisa Shook, shift supervisor, was 
informed in September 1989. Lisa Shook was also pregnant at the 
time. The dispatchers often complained about the schedules and as 
a result, John Kelly, a dispatcher, came up with a "better" system 
of scheduling. That system was later adopted by a second level 
supervisor, Nancy Allred. This new schedule was completed and 
implemented with the modification to allow a three week rotational 
period rather than the two week rotation, after the employees felt 
that two weeks was insufficient time to adjust to shift changes. 
11. The Charging Party left her position to take maternity 
leave effective March 4, 1990 at which time she was under the 
impression that she would be returning to work on a swing shift on 
May 5, 1990. However, she returned on May 4, 1990. 
12. A few days prior to her return, the Charging Party was 
called by Lisa Shook, the first level supervisor, who informed her 
(the Charging Party) that she would return to work on the following 
schedule: Friday, May 4, 1990 - 8:00 a.m. to 1:00 p.m. (CPR 
Training), and 11:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m.; Saturday, May 5, 1990 -
11:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m.; Sunday, May 6, 1990 - 11:00 p.m. to 7:00 
a.m.; Monday, May 7, 1990 - 4:00 p.m. to 12:00 midnight; Tuesday, 
May 8, 1990 - off; Wednesday, May 9, 1990 - off; Thursday, May 10, 
1990 - noon to 8:00 p.m.; Friday, May 11, 1990 - 3:00 p.m. to 11:30 
p.m.; Saturday, May 12, 1990 - 11:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m.; Sunday, May 
13, 1990 - 11:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m.; Monday, May 14, 1990 - 4:00 
p.m. to midnight; Tuesday, May 15, 1990 - off; Wednesday, May 16, 
1990 - off; Thursday, May 17, 1990 - 8:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m.; 
Friday, May 18, 1990 - 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.; Saturday, May 19, 
1990 - 11:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m.; Sunday, May 20, 1990 - 11:00 p.m. 
to 7:00 a.m.; Monday, May 21, 1990 - 4:00 p.m. to 1:00 a.m.; 
Tuesday, May 22, 1990 - off; Wednesday, May 23, 1990 - off; 
Thursday, May 24, 1990 - 8:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m.. This schedule 
resulted because, among other problems, a trainee by the name of 
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Russell was hired and trainees created special scheduling problems 
since they could not be alone during a six to eight week training 
period. 
13. This schedule was admittedly difficult, but the evidence 
shows that the scheduling conditions in the dispatch office were 
general onerous. John Kelly, a fellow dispatch employee, testified 
that although it was a rigorous schedule, he would not have been 
surprised to have received it, and he would have worked it. 
14. Although the Charging Party felt that the schedule was 
made as "punishment", neither at the time of Ms. Shook's telephone 
call nor thereafter did the Charging Party tell Ms. Shook that she 
could not or would not work the assigned schedule. Because Ms. 
Shook knew that the schedule was difficult, she.made an offer to 
the Charging Party that the Charging Party could work graveyard in 
order to avoid the double back or short change schedule. 
15. The second level supervisor, Nancy Allred, was not aware 
that the Charging Party wafe unhappy about the schedule until May 
10, 1990. The Charging Party made no request to do anything about 
the schedule until May 10th on which date she asked for either job 
sharing or a fixed schedule. There was no job sharing authorized 
in the Utah dispatch function during this time period. Ms. Allred 
told the Charging Party that she could ask others to trade and that 
could be done without an okay from Ms. Allred. Trading shifts was 
established routine in the dispatch office, and no advance 
supervisory approval was required. There was no evidence that the 
Charging Party attempted to ask others to trade shifts. 
16. The Charging Party did not work any other of the short 
change shifts. She did work the graveyard shift on May 4, 5, and 
6th, but did not work that shift on May 10, 12, 13, 19 or the 20th. 
She did not work on May 7th, rather she took time off without pay 
for seven hours and took one hour of vacation leave. On Tuesday 
and Wednesday, May 8th and 9th, respectively, she had no scheduled 
shifts. On May 10th she worked from 1200 to 2000 hours. On May 
11th, she worked from 1500 to 2330 hours. On Saturday and Sunday 
May 12th and 13th, she called in sick. She worked on Monday from 
1600 to 2400. She was off on Tuesday and Wednesday. On Thursday, 
she worked from 0800 until 1600, and on Friday, May 18th, she 
worked from 0900 to 1700 hours. On the 19th and 20th the Charging 
Party was off without pay. On May 21, 1990, she worked from 1600 
to 0100 hours. She was off on May 22nd and 23d; on May 24th she 
worked from 0800 until 1600 and after that point she did not work 
since she had voluntarily resigned on May 10, 1990, and gave the 
respondent a two week notice. 
17. Although there was evidence that the Charging Party had 
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been dissatisfied with her job as a dispatcher ever since the job 
had been consolidated into a state operation, there was no evidence 
that the dissatisfaction resulted from any illegal discrimination 
against any employee prior to the allegations of this current 
complaint. 
18. There vas no indication that the Charging Party took 
advantage of the opportunity to request that other employees 
substitute for her in this admittedly difficult work schedule. The 
Charging Party did use self help measures to take herself out of 
this schedule by calling in sick even though she vas not. There 
vas no evidence that any adverse action vas taken or vas^ being 
contemplated as a result of her action. To the contrary, there vas 
evidence that management considered her to be a good employee. 
19. Had the Charging Party vaited through the rotation period 
of three veeks she vould have rotated to the next position since 
all employees vould rotate through all the various schedules and 
the rotation vas based on a three veek period. 
20. The Charging Party vas avare of this rotation although 
she claimed that no one told her that she vould not have to vork 
this schedule indefinitely. 
21. The Charging Party claims that the evidence vhich shows 
the discriminatory basis against vomen vas indicated by the policy 
that employees vould have to be on the job and vould have to 
arrange for short notice child care. In addition, the Charging 
Party states that Ms. Allred got upset vhen she vas informed that 
the Charging Party vas pregnant since the schedule vould have to be 
modified again. However, Ms. Allred did not make the schedule 
which the Charging Party found to be "intolerable." Another 
pregnant supervisor made the schedule, and there vas no evidence 
that the schedule vas made at the direction of Ms. Allred. This 
former condition of employment vas known to the Charging Party as 
early as 1989 when she signed a document acknowledging this fact. 
That document was written in gender neutral terms and there is no 
indication that the policy was ever applied in a discriminatory 
fashion. The latter evidence, although not corroborated, but even 
if believed does not rise to the level of showing motivation for 
discrimination since more than eight weeks had passed between the 
event and the Charging Party's return to work on the schedule in 
question, and since Ms. Allred did not make the schedule. 
LEGAL DISCUSSION: 
A disparate treatment case requires a showing, through direct 
or circumstantial evidence, of an intent to discriminate that shows 
that the employer was motivated by an improper and discriminatory 
— .t- w*_ -*«*„,*. *n Moiovftft in a disparate treatment 
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employment discrimination case has the initial burden to establish 
a prima facie showing of the employer's discrimination. 
Thereafter, the burden- of production shifts to the employer to 
articulate some legitimate non-discriminatory reason for the 
conduct in question. If the employer succeeds, the burden of 
production shifts back to the employee to show that the reasons 
articulated by the employer were mere pretext for discrimination. 
Despite the shifting of the burden of production in the disparate 
treatment discrimination cases, the burden of persuasion remains 
with the Charging Party throughout the case. 
In order to establish a prima facie case, the Charging-Party 
must show that she was a member of a group protected by UCA § 34-
35-6; that she was qualified for the job; that she was 
constructively discharged, despite her qualifications, and as a 
part of the constructive discharge, she must show .that a reasonable 
person would view the working conditions as intolerable*. 
The Charging Party was a member of a group protected by UCA 
S34-35-6. She applied for and was granted a maternity leave based 
on pregnancy during the period in question. There was never any 
dispute during the course of the hearing that she was qualified for 
her job. The major issue was whether the employer discriminated 
against the Charging Party by adverse job action and if so, whether 
the conditions were so unreasonable that she was justified in 
discharging herself from those conditions. 
Although the schedule the Charging Party complains of was 
difficult, she failed to take action such as asking others to work 
her shifts which was permissible, or to simply wait for the 
rotational process to obtain a better work schedule. She did call 
in sick, and took herself out of the more difficult parts of the 
schedule. There was no evidence that any adverse action was taken 
against her or was even being contemplated. In addition, she had 
the means within her control to properly modify the schedule to her 
liking by asking other workers to trade shifts, but there was no 
evidence that she made any attempt to change the schedule beyond 
asking the supervisor to modify it. 
There was no indication in testimony at the hearing that the 
employer ever singled out the Charging Party simply because she was 
pregnant or had been pregnant. According to testimony, the 
Charging Party would have rotated out of the schedule as all 
employees rotate through all the schedules of the shifts with each 
employee's schedule being approximately three weeks in length. 
The employer articulated legitimate reasons for the schedule 
such as the fact that they had at least one and on occasion two 
vacancies during the previous several months that training of a new 
employee necessitated schedule aberrations and the normal process 
SANDRA SHEIKH 
ORDER 
PAGE SEVEN 
of people being sick. The necessity of changing the schedule was 
evident since during the time that the schedule was in operation, 
the Charging Party called in sick on a number of occasions during 
this period simply because she •did not like the schedule, and other 
dispatch employees had to substitute for her on short notice. 
Although the schedule in question deviated from one of the normal 
shifts, the employer satisfactorily explained the aberrations. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: 
1. During the evidentiary hearing it was determined that the 
Charging Party had barely managed to make a prima facie case _Upon 
retrospect, and considering the total evidence, it is apparent that 
the balance must shift in favor of determining that the employee 
failed to make a prima facie case in this matter. In any event, 
assuming that the employee did make a prima facie the employer 
articulated legitimate reasons why the Charging Party's schedule 
was difficult and therefore it is concluded that the Charging Party 
cannot prevail. The employer, the State of Utah, the Utah 
Department of Public Safety did not discriminate against Sandra 
Shiekh because of her pregnancy, and her work schedule for the 
period May 4 through May 24, 1993, although difficult was not 
intolerable. Ms. Shiekh's resignation was therefore not a 
constructive discharge. There was therefore no discriminatory or 
unfair employment practices under UCA Sect. 34-35-6(1)(a). 
ORDER: 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Charging Party, Sandra 
Sheikh, has failed to establish a prima facie case in the claim of 
discrimination by her employer, the State of Utah, Department of 
Public Safety, and thus that claim should be and is hereby 
dismissed with prejudice. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the 
foregoing shall be filed in writing with the Industrial Commission 
of Utah within thirty (30) days of the date hereof, specifying in 
detail the particular errors and objections, and, unless so filed, 
this Order shall be final and not subject to review or appeal. In 
the event a Motion for Review is timely filed, the parties shall 
have fifteen (15) days from the date of filing with the Commission, 
in which to file a written response with the Commission in 
SANDRA SHEIKH 
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accordance with Section 63-46b-12(2), Utah Code Annotated. 
Dated this 5 _ ^ y .of s^x7jt~ . 1993. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
n A. Sims 
strative Lav Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF HAILING 
I hereby certify that on the Jj . day of September, 1993, the 
attached ORDER in the case of Sandra"Sheikh was mailed, postage 
pre-paid to the following persons at the following addresses: 
Sandra Sheikh 
1101 S Carbon Ave #73 
Price UT 84501 
Suzanne West, Atty 
455 E 500 S 
Salt Lake City UT 84111 
Stephen Schwendiman, Assistant AG 
36 S State - 11th Floor * ~/f)f \r y 
Salt Lake City UT 84111 [J^uX^^^P^ 
Anna R Jensen, Director 
UADD 
UIC 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
June s. Harrison, Paralegal 
Adjudication Division 
/jsh 
sheikh 
ADDENDUM B 
Order Denying Motion For Review, August 25, 1994 
TEE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
SANDRA SHEIKH, * 
Charging Party, * 
* ORDER DENYING 
VS. * MOTION FOR REVIEW 
STATE OF UTAH/UTAH DEPARTMENT * UADD NO. 90-04€7 
OF PUBLIC SAFETY, * EEOC NO. 35C-90-0413 
Respondent. * 
This matter is before the Industrial Commission of Utah 
pursuant to the Motion For Review filed by Sandra Sheikh, seeking 
review of an Administrative Law Judge's Order which dismissed Ms. 
Sheikh's charge of unlawful discrimination against the State of 
Utah's Department of Public Safety. 
The Commission exercises jurisdiction over this Motion For 
Review pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-12, Utah Code Ann. §34-
35-7.1(11) and Utah Admin. Code R560-1-4.A.5. 
BACKGROUND 
Ms. Sheikh filed a complaint with the Utah Antidiscrimination 
Division ("UADD") charging that the Utah Department of Public 
Safety ("Public Safety") unlawfully discriminated against her 
because of pregnancy. After an investigation, UADD found 
reasonable cause to believe"that Ms. Sheikh had been subjected to 
unlawful discrimination due to her pregnancy. 
Public Safety requested and was granted an evidentiary 
hearing. After a lengthy hearing with several witnesses and 
numerous items of documentary evidence, the ALJ concluded that Ms. 
Sheikh had failed to establish a : prima facie case of 
discrimination. Ms. Sheikh then filed hfer Motion For Review with 
the Commission. In her Motion For Review, Ms. Sheikh argues that 
the preponderance of the evidence does not support the ALJ's 
findings and that the findings themselves are inadequate. 
riFPIWgS py TACT 
The Commission adopts the findings of fact set for*:* in the 
decision of the ALJ. 
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR REVIEW 
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Section S34-35-6 of Utah's Anti-Discrimination Act sets forth 
the "discriminatory or prohibited employment practices" which are 
prohibited by the Act: 
(1) It is a discriminatory or prohibited employment 
practice: 
(a) (i) for an employer to . . • discriminate in 
matters of . . . conditions of employment against any 
person otherwise qualified, because of . . • pregnancy, 
childbirth, or pregnancy-related conditions. . . . . 
(emphasis added.) 
Ms. Sheikh argues that Public Safety assigned her an unusually 
difficult work schedule as punishment for taking maternity leave. 
However, for the various reasons detailed in his decision, the A U 
concluded otherwise. The ALJ found, and the commission agrees, 
that Ms. Sheikh's schedule was not motivated by a discriminatory 
purpose, but by the employer's staffing needs. Furthermore, Ms. 
Sheikh did not take advantage of opportunities to modify the 
schedule. Finally, the* staffing problems that caused the 
difficulties with Ms. Sheikh's schedule would have been resolved 
within a few weeks. 
ORDER 
Based on the foregoing, the Commission denies Ms. Sheikh's 
Motion For Review and affirms the ALJ's decision. It is so 
ordered. 
IMPORTANT* NOTIFICATION OF APPEAL RIGHTS FOLLOWS ON NEXT PAGE 
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR REVIEW 
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Any party may ask the Commission to reconsider this Order by 
filing a request for reconsideration with the Commission within 20 
days of the date of this Order. Alternatively, any party may 
appeal this Order by filing a Petition For Review with the Court of 
Appeals within 30 days of the date of this Order. 
CERTIFICATE OF HAILING 
I, Alan Hennebold, certify that I did mail by prepaid first 
class postage, except as noted below, a copy of the ORDER DENYING 
MOTION FOR REVIEW in the case of Sandra Sheikh v. State of Utah 
Department of Public Safety. Case Number 90-0467, on the^CQ 
August, 1994, to the following; 
ay of 
Suzanne West, Attorney 
MCDONALD, WEST & BENSON 
455 E. 500 S. 
Salt Lake City, Utah '84111 
Stephen Schwendiman, Attorney 
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE 
4120 State Office Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Diane Kearrfs 
Industrial Commission of Utah 
ah\90-0467oA 
ADDENDUM C 
Exhibit R-4, Utah Department of Public Safety 
Radio Dispatcher Supplemental Information, 
signed by Sandra Sheikh, October 26, 1989 
M'Cfc DPS COMM. TEL:801-965-493? Sep 06.90 23:33 No.004 P.15 
OTAK PEPASTKEKT Of EPBLIC SkTVTt 
PAD20 DISPATCHER 
SUPPLSKEKTXI. ZRFOXKATZON 
*hia supplemental information ie being provided to you to you may 
decide if e position •• e ftedio Dispatcher ie the best career choice for 
you. We ask that you read it carefully, sign and return it to ee prior to 
testing for this position. 
Experience has shown that many applicants for Radio Dispatcher consider 
only the positive aspects of the position* while not knowing or ignoring 
•one of its less attractive features* As a result* when new employee* 
encounter the negative* they sometimes raaet by leaving the job well before 
training is complete, tarly resignations* which result frem leek of 
accurate Job knowledge, contribute to a such higher attrition rate and 
higher training ooata for the Department ef public Safety than la desirable. 
While there are aany satisfying and rewarding aspeete to the Jtedio 
Dispatcher position* and there la no question that dispatchers sake a 
significant contribution to the welfare and safety of their fellow cltlsens* 
it i§ important for applicants to carefully consider both the negative and 
the positive features before deciding to test for the position. 
The job fectors listed below are festures ef the Radio Dlepateher 
position. Zf any ef theee faetora present problems for you, we atrongly 
suggest that you consider alternative employment cboleea which nay better 
fit your career goals. 
WOSSIWC EKVIRPKKEKT 
• •• enable to physically leave your work cite (I.e., walk around, use 
the restreon* get a drink* cnoke* etc.) at any time without proper 
coverage ef your position. 
• be unable to leave your position to tat lunch. 
• be enable to schedule your own breaka. 
• be enable to sacks inside the building. 
• Save limited opportunity to socialite with co-workers er ethers during 
your work shift. 
• work within an organisation structured en a allitery model (i.e., aaey 
have to wear a uniform and confers to growing standardet work through 
a highly structured ehaln-of-command* during the probationary period* 
be regularly reminded ef errors and mietakes in order to meet strict 
performance standardet submit to written Job-related evaluations 
frequently during your probationary period)* 
EXHIBIT 
'RICE-EPS CQMM. TFI .fiAi eec *«•»-, 
n. TEL.801-965-4937 Sep 06.90 23:33 No.004 P.16 
J&&:0 DISPATCHER 8UPPLEKEKTA1 IHPORKXTIOK *8?e I 
• landle constructive critleitn f rea co-workere ana •opervieore who eiay 
have aeeertlve personalities. 
• The probationary period la utilised a* an extenaion of tba oaloetlen 
process. An employee nay be rejected during probation If they bava not 
deaonetrated eatlafactory performance of the duties or baa denonetrated 
a poor attitude, inceapatibillty or inability to do the Job, or poor 
judge&ent. 
• All your calla and radio traneniaelona aro recorded. 
• Parfera at a rapid pace, amid estrone confusion, with no ohanea to 
organite or prioritize tba work* 
- Maintain intense eonoentration and attention for extended periods of 
tine. 
• Work in a aecured area, where friends or family members »ay Dot be 
allowed without prior clearance. 
• fubnit to an exteneive, aeneitive, and confidential background 
investigation. 
WORK SCHEDULE 
- »e required to work any of three ahifta or cover ahifta (i.e., day, 
awing, graveyard or any variation). 
• ae required to work weekenda on a regular basie. 
• be finable to ehooae your daya off or your ahifta. 
• May bava to work eplit daya off during a work week (i.e., daya off M y 
be Tueeday and Friday). 
• May have to work any or all bolidaya. 
• lave to procure own child care at one hour'a notice for any tine of day 
or night. 
• Save to eet own child care for weekenda, bolidaya and middle of the 
alght en a regular basie. 
• lave to arrange for reliable transportation to work on a regular baa is. 
- be prepared to work iaueedUtely when your ehift begins. Tardiness la 
unacceptable and la cauae for diaciplinary action. 
• May bava to cancel daya off or holiday plant on abort notice. 
MCE-DPS COMM. TEL:801-965-4937 Sep 06,90 23:34 No.004 P . l ? 
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FUE1TC MUTIONS 
• Ant we r telephone calls where someone Xa screening at you and a till be 
«bla to use calming techniquea and control tbe conversation. 
• Answer telephone calla vhere the caller veea obseene language towards 
you ana still be able to raapond to the call appropriately• 
• Anawer and raapond appropriately to calls where the caller ia drunk, 
irrational* confueed, hysterical, severely wounded or a eosblnstlon of 
some of the Above* 
• Anawer and raapond to calla vhere a violent crime ia in progress, 
(i.e., family fight, aeeault, armed robbery, suicide), 
• Answer and respond to calls in which the caller ia alaioat impossible to 
understand because of language, equipment, or tbe inability of the 
caller to convey a message* 
• Save to stake quick tfeelsiens.cn which one or nore person's life and 
safety ia at stske while you have limited information or mieinformation 
whether intsntional or unintentional. 
- Be able to refer an irate caller to the appropriate agency without 
offending then* 
• Bandle life-threatening, emergency tituatiene en the radio, involving 
police offieera while maintaining a calm, profeaaional demeanor. 
• Anawer and raapond to calla for ambulanee/paramediee and be able to 
help the peraen by giving inatruotiona (i.e., CPU procedure step by 
step, mooth-to-»euth rssuseltation procedure, childbirth instruction*) 
until the paramedics arrive. 
tty aignature affirms that I have read and .const fie red each factor listed* 
Snndrfi \)hf\kJ\ KAHB^ 
CFleaee Print) 
t m i n m t 
ADDENDUM D 
Exhibit P-5, pp. R.276-7# 279, John Kelly's 
proposed three week rotational schedule and 
Nancy Hansen's implementation letter dated 
February 22, 1990 
PRICE DPS COMM. TEL:801-965-4937 Sep 07»90 22:07 No.002 P.04 
M E M O R A N D U M 
TO: DISPATCH 
FROM: HANCY 1 . HANSEN 
SUBJECT: SCHEDULE 
r w « February 22. 1990 
As you have heard, Liaa will be returning from maternity leave March 2, 
1990 and vill resume her regular ehifti and daye off* In addition, 
Sandra plans to work up through March 2. 
Where this i% all the day prior to the beginning of the next pey period, 
we vill go into a new achedule effective March 3* 
Immediately following our crtw meeting lest month John worked up a 
achedule which improves the one ve %x% presently using* Be made it 
ao there is double coverage every Sunday, thereby allowing that day 
to be requested off* Also, a request that it be rotated every 3 weeks 
vas approved, as there have been complaints that 2 weeks is too aoon. 
John vas also able to work in 3 day long changes when the achedule 
rotates. 
The actual achedule vill be in the notebook ahortly and a sample copy 
is attached. As with the current achedule, this one will rotate down 
and works well when it goes into effect, not creating any abort changes, 
with the exception of John. Also, day off requesta already in vill 
atill be honored. 
I appreciate your patience vith the achedule, especially the past lev 
veeks where it has changed ao often. 
Thanks! 
^ a ^ ^ 
PRICE DPS COMM. TEL:801-S65-4937 Sep 07.90 22:07 No.002 P.05 
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ADDENDUM E 
Exhibit R-l, Rotational Schedule for three 
three-week periods, 5-5-90 to 5-25-90, 5-26-90 
to 6-15-90, and 6-16-90 to 7-6-90 
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ADDENDUM P 
Exhibit R-2, Sandra Sheikh resignation letter, 
dated 5-10-90 
% • 
6 ^ * ( . v i V^V-' 
REASONS FOR VOLUNTARY TERMINATION 
(Employe's Ntmt) , ,
 t -N / ^ „ (Social Stcunty No) (Employ** Ntmt) , , ^ O * A (social stcumy NO ) ^ 
(Company N a m * ) 7 I ' ' . „ ( C p m p a n * Addniu) TA 5f 
vofcntariiy quitting my Job with you on O <a^HT ' 7 C tor «w following INNDK 3 ^ £ , ^ 7 " &J / H 
^r, , (D*») 
Signod 
(EmployM) (E 
n - 5 1 /£>' %9 
evuier 
ADDENDUM G 
Exhibit P-l, pp. R.217-18, Record of actual 
time worked for 4-28-90 to 5-29-90 
>RICE DPS COMM. TEU801-965-493? Sep 06.90 23:30 No.004 P.12 
JICE DPS COMM. TEL:801-965-493? Sep 06.90 23:30 No.004 P.13 
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ADDENDUM H 
Sandra Sheikh's Charge of Discrimination, dated 8-14-90 
CHARGE OF DISCRIMINATION 
T h i i form i t effected by the ^rivocy Act of 1974; toe Prtvocy Act Stotemon? on reverse 
before completing th i i form. 
I N T E R CHARGE NUMBER 
C F E P A 90-0467 
• E E O C 35C-90-0413 
UTAH-DISCRIMINATION DIVISION 
and EEOC 
(State or local Agency, if any) 
NAME (Indicate Mr., M*.. or Mrs.) 
Sandra Sheikh 
(HOME TELEPHONE HO, (include Area C*d> 
1801)637-6467 
STREET AOORESS 
1101 So. Carbon Ave. 
CITY, STATE AND ZIP CODE 
Pr ice , Utah 84501 
COUNTY 
NAMED IS THE EMPLOYER, LABOR ORGANIZATION, EMPLOYMENT AGENCY, APPRENTICESHIP COMMiTTEE% 
STATE OR LOCAL GOVERNMENT AGENCY WHO DISCRIMINATED AGAINST ME (// more than one list below.) 
NAME Doug Bocero/uirector 
S ta te of Utah/DPS 
NO. OF EMPLOYEES/MEMBERS 
15+ 
TELEPHONE NUMBER (include Area Cede) 
(801)637-0893 
STREET AOORESS 
940 South Carbon Avenue Price, Utah 84501 
C I T Y , STATE AND ZIP CODE 
NAME (TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code) 
STREET ADDRESS CITY, STATE AND ZIP CODE 
^ L . 
* ! & / » 
CAUSE OF DISCRIMINATION BASED^N (Check appropriate box(es)) C
 Q 
QRACE | | COLOR G 2 * E X • R E L I G I O N I iNATIONAi; 
Q * o e • R E T A L I A T I O N • OTHER ($pec»w f f l A l E f t J l T y 
DATE MOST RECENT OR CONTINUING 
DISCRIMINATION TOOK PLACE 
THE PARTICULARS ARE (If additional space it needed, attached extra, sheets)). 
PERSONAL HARM: As a result of the unfavorable schedule I was afforded following my, 
maternity leave, I voluntarily terminated my employment with the State of Utah/DPS afted 
10 1/2 years of service. 
RESPONDENTS REASON: Hone. 
DISCRIMINATION STATEMENT: I have reason to believe that • I have been illegallj) 
discriminated against which I attribute to my sex, female and the fact that I tool! 
maternity leave, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended 
and. the Utah Anti-Discrimination Act of 1965, as amended, in that: I left my positiori 
for'maternity leave effective 3/4/90 at which time I.'made the necessary arrangement witM 
my supervisor, N. Hansen to return to my position on the swing shift. I informed Ms J 
Hansen I would return to work on 5/5/90. A few days prior to my return datfr, Lis* 
Hook/Shift Supervisor called me and scheduled me to return to work on five different 
shifts within a one week period. I was unable to comply with this stressful schedule a1 
which time I met with my supervisor and attempted to work something out to no avail. '. 
made every effort to work with management following my maternity leave however because 
of management's refusal to offer only shifts 1 was unable to "work i" was "forced"TS 
terminated my employment after ten and one half years of service. 
n 1 ol«o wont this chorgo filed* with tho E E O C 
I w i l l advise the ogoncios if I change my address or to I o phono 
I" number and I w i l l cooporoto fully with thorn in tho processing of my charge in accord on co with their procaduiw*. 
I declara vndar penalty of par jury that the foregoing is true 
to and Local Raquiramenti 
thcTTh ovt road the above charga and that it 
of my know lodge, information and belief . 
12*0 f C0MPL"AT^ 
ADDENDUM I 
Utah Code Ann. § 3 4 - 3 5 - 6 (1993) 
34-35-6 LABOR IN GENERAL 
financial support regardless of whether or not the employer was or is 
legally obligated to furnish support; or for an employer to give 
preference in employment to any person whose education or training 
was substantially financed by the employer for a period of two years 
or more. 
(b) Nothing contained in this chapter applies to any business or 
enterprise on or near an Indian reservation with respect to any publicly 
announced employment practice of the business or enterprise under which 
preferential treatment is given to any individual because he is a native 
American Indian living on or near an Indian reservation. 
(c) Nothing contained in this chapter shall be interpreted to require any 
employer, employment agency, labor organization, vocational school, joint 
labor-management committee, or apprenticeship program subject to this 
chapter to grant preferential treatment to any individual or to any group 
because of the race, color, religion, sex, age, national origin, or handicap of 
the individual or group on account of an imbalance which may exist with 
respect to the total number or percentage of persons of any race, color, 
religion, sex, age, national origin, or handicap employed by any employer, 
referred or classified for employment by an employment agency or labor 
organization, admitted to membership or classified by any labor drgani-
2ation, or admitted to or employed in, any apprenticeship or other training 
program, in comparison with the total number or percentage of persons of 
that race, color, religion, sex, age, national origin, or handicap in any 
community or county or in the available work force in any community or 
county. 
(3) It is not a discriminatory or prohibited practice with respect to age to 
observe the terms of a bona fide seniority system or any bona fide employment 
benefit plan such as a retirement, pension, or insurance plan which is not a 
subterfuge to evade the purposes of this chapter except that no such employee 
benefit plan shall excuse the failure to hire any individual. 
(4) Notwithstanding Subsection (3), or any other statutory provision to the 
contrary, other than Subsection (5) and Section 67-5-8, and except where age 
is a bona fide occupational qualification, no person shall be subject to 
involuntary termination or retirement from employment on the basis of age 
alone, if the individual is 40 years of age or older. 
(5) Nothing in this section prohibits compulsory retirement of an employee 
who has attained at least 65 years of age, and who, for the two-year period 
immediately before retirement, is employed in a bona fide executive or a high 
policymaking position, if that employee is entitled to an immediate nonforfeit-
able annual retirement benefit from his employer's pension, profit-sharing, 
savings, or deferred compensation plan, or any combination of those plans, 
which benefit equals, in the aggregate, at least $44,000. 
History: C. 1953, 94*35-6, enacted by L. testing of prospective employee end employees, 
1969, ch. S5, f 165; 1971, ch. 78,1 10; 1973, ( 34-38-3. 
ch. 65,1 1; 1975, ch. 100,1 1; 1979, ch. 136, Grievance end appeal procedures, Title 67, 
I 8; 1985, ch. 189, I 8; 1985, ch. 803, I 1; Chapter 19a. 
1987, ch. 806, f 4; 1989, ch. 155,1 1. State end state officers and employees gov-
Cross-References, — Drug and alcohol erned by this section, f 67*19-4. 
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because of race, color, sex, pregnancy, childbirth, or pregnancy-related 
conditions, religion, national origin, age, if the individual is 40 years 
of age or older, or handicap; 
(iii) to print, or publish, or cause to be printed or published, any 
notice or advertisement relating to employment by the employer, or 
membership in or any classification or referral for employment by a 
labor organization, or relating to any classification or referral for 
employment by an employment agency, indicating any preference, 
limitation, specification, or discrimination based on race, color, sex, 
pregnancy, childbirth, or pregnancy-related conditions, religion, na-
tional origin, age, if the individual is 40 years of age or older, or 
handicap except that a notice or advertisement may indicate a 
preference, limitation, specification, or discrimination based on race, 
color, religion, sex, pregnancy, childbirth, or pregnancy-related condi-
tions, age, national origin, or handicap when religion, race, color, sex, 
age, national origin, or handicap is a bona fide occupational qualifi-
cation for employment. 
Nothing contained in Subsections (lXa) through (1X0 shall be construed to 
prevent the termination of employment of an individual who is physically, 
mentally, or emotionally unable to perform the duties required by that 
individual's employment, or to preclude the variance of insurance premiums, of 
coverage on account of age, or affect any restriction upon the activities of 
individuals licensed by the liquor authority with respect to persons under 21 
years of age. 
(2) (a) It is not a discriminatory or prohibited employment practice: 
(i) for an employer to hire and employ employees, for an employ-
ment agency to classify or refer for employment any individual, for a 
labor organization to classify its membership or to classify or refer for 
employment any individual or for an employer, labor organization, or 
joint labor-management committee controlling apprenticeship or 
other training or retraining programs to admit or employ any indi-
vidual in any such program, on the basis of religion, sex, pregnancy, 
childbirth, or pregnancy-related conditions, age, national origin, or 
handicap in those certain instances where religion, sex, pregnancy, 
childbirth, or pregnancy-related conditions, age, if the individual is 40 
years of age or older, national origin, or handicap is a bona fide 
occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal opera-
tion of that particular business or enterprise; 
(ii) for a school, college, university, or other educational institution 
to hire and employ employees of a particular religion if the school, 
college, university, or other educational institution is, in whole or in 
substantial part, owned, supported, controlled, or managed by a 
particular religious corporation, association, or society, or if the 
curriculum of the school, college, university, or other educational 
institution is directed toward the propagation of a particular religion; 
(iii) for an employer to give preference in employment to his own 
spouse, son, son-in-law, daughter, daughter-in-law, or to any person 
for whom the employer is or would be liable to furnish fym»W»l 
support if those persons were unemployed; or for an employer to give 
preference in employment to any person to whom the employer during 
the preceding six months has furnished more than one-half of total 
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(b) for an employment agency: 
(i) to refUse to list and properly classify for employment, or to 
refuse to refer an individual for employment, in a known available job 
for which the individual is otherwise qualified, because of race, color, 
sex, pregnancy, childbirth, or pregnancy-related conditions, religion, 
national origin, age, if the individual is 40 years of age or older, or 
handicap; 
(ii) to comply with a request from an employer for referral of 
applicants for employment if the request indicates either directly or 
indirectly that the employer discriminates in employment on account 
of race, color, sex, pregnancy, childbirth, or pregnancy-related condi-
tions, religion, national origin, age, if the individual is 40 years of age 
or older, or handicap; 
(c) for a labor organization to exclude any individual otherwise qualified 
from full membership rights in the labor organization, or to expel the 
individual from membership in the labor organization, or to otherwise 
discriminate against or harass any of its members in full employment of 
work opportunity, or representation, because of race, sex, pregnancy, 
childbirth, or pregnancy-related conditions, religion, national origin, age, 
if the individual is 40 years of age or older, or handicap; 
(d) for any employer, employment agency, or labor organization to print, 
or circulate, or cause to be printed or circulated, any statement, adver-
tisement, or publication, or to use any form of application for employment 
or membership, or to make any inquiry in connection with prospective 
employment or membership, which expresses, either directly or indirectly, 
any limitation, specification, or discrimination as to race, color, religion, 
sex, pregnancy, childbirth, or pregnancy-related conditions, national ori-
gin, age, if the individual is 40 years of age or older, or handicap or intent 
to make any such limitation, specification, or discrimination; unless based 
upon a bona fide occupational qualification, or required by, and given to, an 
agency of government for security reasons; 
(e) for any person, whether or not an employer, an employment agency, 
a labor organization, or the employees or members thereof, to aid, incite, 
compel, or coerce the doing of an act defined in this section to be a 
discriminatory or prohibited employment practice; or to obstruct or 
prevent any person from complying with this chapter, or any order issued 
under it; or to attempt, either directly or indirectly, to commit any act 
prohibited in this section; 
(f) for any employer, labor organization, joint apprenticeship commit-
tee, or vocational school, providing, coordinating, or controlling appren-
ticeship programs, or providing, coordinating, or controlling on-the-job-
training programs, instruction, training, or retraining programs: 
(i) to deny to, or withhold from, any qualified person, because of 
race, color, sex, pregnancy, childbirth, or pregnancy-related condi-
tions, religion, national origin, age, if the individual is 40 years of age 
or older, or handicap the right to be admitted to, or participate in any 
apprenticeship training program, on-the-job-training program, or 
other occupational instruction, training or retraining program; 
(ii) to discriminate against or harass any qualified person in that 
person's pursuit of such programs, or to discriminate against such a 
person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of such programs, 
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(b) Any of the following may conduct hearings: 
(i) the commission; 
(ii) any commissioner; 
(iii) the coordinator; or 
(iv) a hearing examiner or agent appointed by the commission. 
(c) If a witness fails or refuses to obey a subpoena issued by the 
commission, the commission may petition the district court to enforce the 
subpoena. 
(d) (i) No person may be excused from attending or testifying* or from 
producing records, correspondence, documents, or other evidence in 
obedience to a subpoena issued by the commission under the author-
ity of this section on the ground that the evidence or the testimony 
required may tend to incriminate him or subject him to any penalty or 
forfeiture. 
(ii) No person may be prosecuted or subjected to any penalty or 
forfeiture for or on account of any transaction, matter, or thing 
concerning which he shall be compelled to testify or produce evidence 
after having claimed his privilege against self-incrimination, except 
that a person testifying is not exempt from prosecution and punish-
ment for peijuiy. 
Hiftory: C. 1953, S4-35-5, enacted by L. Crow-Reference*. —Grievance and appeal 
1969, ch. 85,I 164; 1979, cb. 136,1 2; 1979, procedures, Title 67, Chapter 19a. 
ch. 139, i 1; 1985, ch. 189, ( 2; 1989, cb. 191, 
I I . 
34-35-6. Discriminatory or unfair employment practices 
— Permitted practices. 
(1) It is a discriminatory or prohibited employment practice: 
(a) (i) for an employer to refuse to hire, or promote, or to discharge, 
demote, terminate any person, or to retaliate against, harass, or 
discriminate in matters of compensation or in terms, privileges, and 
conditions of employment against any person otherwise qualified, 
because of race, color, sex, pregnancy, childbirth, or pregnancy-related 
conditions, age, if the individual is 40 years of age or older, religion, 
national origin, or handicap. No applicant nor candidate for any job or 
position may be considered "otherwise qualified," unless he possesses 
the education, training, ability, moral character, integrity, disposition 
to work, adherence to reasonable rules and regulations, and other job 
related qualifications required by an employer for any particular job, 
job classification, or position to be filled or created; 
(ii) as used in this chapter, "to discriminate in matters of compen-
sation" means the payment of differing wages or salaries to employees 
having substantially equal experience, responsibilities, and skill for 
the particular job. However, nothing in this chapter prevents in-
creases in pay as a result of longevity with the employer, if the salary 
increases are uniformly applied and available to all employees on a 
substantially proportional basis. Nothing in this section prohibits an 
employer and employee from agreeing to a rate of pay or work 
schedule designed to protect the employee from loss of Social Security 
payment or benefits if the employee is eligible for those payments; 
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ADDENDUM J 
Utah Code Ann. § 34-35-7.1 (1993) 
34-35-7 LABOR IK GENERAL 
between supervisor and another, 86 A.LR Fed. tional origin discrimination in violation of Title 
230. VII of Civil Right* Act of 1964 (42 USCS 
Circumstances which warrant finding of con- {§ 2000e et seqj, 104 A.L.R Fed. 816. 
structive discharge in cases under Age Dis- Protection of debtor from acts of discrimina-
crimination in Employment Act (29 USCS tion by private entity and under | 525(b) of 
H 621 et seq), 93 A.L.R. Fed. 10. Bankruptcy Code of 1978 (11 USCS $ 525(b)), 
When does adverse employment decision jo5 AL.R Fed. 555. 
based on person's foreign accent constitute na-
34-35-7. Repealed. 
Repeals, — Section 34-35-7 (L. 1969, ch. 85, relating to violations, eomplsints, and prooe-
I 166; 1979, ch. 189, ft 2; 1981, ch. 1, ft 1), dure, was repealed by Lews 1985, ch. 189, ft 5. 
34-35-7.1. Procedure for aggrieved person to file claim — 
Investigations — Adjudicative proceedings — 
Settlement —• Reconsideration — Determina-
tion. 
(1) (a) Any person claiming to be aggrieved by a discriminatory or prohib-
ited employment practice may by himself, his attorney, or his agent, make, 
sign, and file with the commission a request for agency action. 
(b) Every request for agency action shall be verified under oath or 
affirmation. 
(c) A request for agency action made under this section shall be filed 
within 180 days after the alleged discriminatory or prohibited employ-
ment practice occurred. 
(2) Any employer, labor organization, joint apprenticeship committee, or 
vocational school who has employees or members who refuse or threaten to 
refuse to comply with the provisions of this chapter may file with the 
commission a request for agency action asking the commission for assistance 
to obtain their compliance by conciliation or other remedial action. 
(3) (a) Before a hearing is set or held as part of any adjudicative proceeding, 
the commission shall promptly assign an investigator to attempt a 
settlement between the parties by conference, conciliation, or persuasion. 
(b) If no settlement is reached, the investigator shall make a prompt 
impartial investigation of all allegations made in the request for agency 
action. 
(c) The commission and its staff, agents, and employees shall conduct 
every investigation in fairness to all parties and agencies involved, and 
may not attempt a settlement between the parties if it is dear that no 
discriminatory or prohibited employment practice has occurred. 
(d) If the aggrieved party wishes to withdraw the request for agency 
action, he must do so prior to the issuance of a final order. 
(4) (a) If the initial attempts at settlement are unsuccessful, and the 
investigator uncovers insufficient evidence during his investigation to 
support the allegations of a discriminatory or prohibited employment 
practice set out in the request for agency action, the investigator shall 
formally report these findings to the director. 
(b) Upon receipt of the investigator's report, the director may issue a 
determination and order for dismissal of the adjudicative proceeding. 
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(c) A party may make a written request to the director for an eviden-
tiary hearing to review de novo the director's determination and order 
within 30 days of the date of the determination and order for dismissal. 
(d) If the director receives no timely request for a hearing, the deter-
mination and order issued by the director becomes the final order of the 
commission. 
(5) (a) If the initial attempts at settlement are unsuccessful and the 
investigator uncovers sufficient evidence during his investigation to sup-
port the allegations of a discriminatory or prohibited employment practice 
set out in the request for agency action, the investigator shall formally 
report these findings to the director. 
(b) Upon receipt of the investigator's report the director may issue a 
determination and order based on the investigator's report. 
(c) A party may file a written request to the director for an evidentiary 
hearing to review de novo the director's determination and order within 30 
days of the date of the determination and order. 
(d) If the director receives no timely request for a hearing, the deter-
mination and order issued by the director requiring the respondent to 
cease any discriminatory or prohibited employment practice and to 
provide relief to the aggrieved party becomes the final order of the 
commission. 
(6) In any adjudicative proceeding, the investigator who investigated the 
matter may not participate in a hearing except as a witness, nor may he 
participate in the deliberations of the presiding officer. 
(7) Prior to commencement of an evidentiary hearing, the party filing the 
request for agency action may reasonably and fairly amend any allegation, and 
the respondent may amend its answer.' Those amendments may be made 
during or after a hearing but only with permission of the presiding officer. 
(8) (a) If, upon all the evidence at a hearing, the presiding officer finds that 
a respondent has not engaged in a discriminatory or prohibited employ-
ment practice, the presiding officer shall issue an order dismissing the 
request for agency action containing the allegation of a discriminatory or 
prohibited employment practice. 
(b) The presiding officer may order that the respondent be reimbursed 
by the complaining party for his attorneys' fees and costs. 
(9) If upon all the evidence at the hearing, the presiding officer finds that a 
respondent has engaged in a discriminatory or prohibited employment prac-
tice, the presiding officer shall issue an order requiring the respondent to cease 
any discriminatory or prohibited employment practice and to provide relief to 
the complaining party, including reinstatement, back pay and benefits, and 
attorneys' fees and costs. 
(10) Conciliation between the parties is to be urged and facilitated at all 
stages of the adjudicative process. 
(11) (a) Either party may file a written request for review of the order 
issued by the presiding officer in accordance with Section 63-46b-12. 
(b) If there is no timely request for review the order issued by the 
presiding officer becomes the final order of the commission. 
. U2) An order of the commission under Subsection (HXa) is subject to 
judicial review as provided in Section 63-46b-16. 
(13) The commission shall have authority to make rules concerning proce-
dures under this chapter in accordance with Title 63, Chapter 46a, Utah 
Administrative Rulemaking Act 
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(14) The members of the commission and its staff may not divulge or make 
public any information gained from any investigation, settlement negotiation, 
or proceeding before the commission except in the following: 
(a) Information used by the director in making any determination may 
be provided to all interested parties for the purpose of preparation for and 
participation in proceedings before the commission. 
(b) General statistical information may be disclosed provided the iden-
tities of the individuals or parties are not disclosed. 
(c) Information may be disclosed for inspection by the attorney general 
or other legal representatives of the state or commission. 
(d) Information may be disclosed for information and reporting require-
ments of the federal government. 
(15) The procedures contained in this section are the exclusive remedy 
under state law for employment discrimination based upon race, color, sex, 
retaliation, pregnancy, childbirth, or pregnancy-related conditions, age, reli-
gion, national origin, or handicap. 
(16) The commencement of an action under federal law for relief based upon 
any act prohibited by this chapter bars the commencement or continuation of 
any adjudicative proceeding before the Utah Antidiscrimination Division in 
connection with the same claims under this chapter. Nothing in this subsection 
is intended to alter, amend, modify, or impair the exclusive remedy provision 
set forth in Subsection (15). 
History: C. 1953,8445-7.1, enacted by L. 
1985, cb- 189,1 4; 1987, ch. 161,1 105; 1990, 
eh. 63, | 2; 1991, eh. 188, t 1. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amend-
ment, effective April 23, 1990, inserted "for 
agency action" in Subsection (1Kb) and "for 
agency action made under this section" in Sub-
section (lKc); substituted "request for agency 
action" for "written charge" in Subsection (2), "a 
hearing is set or held as part of any adjudica-
tive proceeding, the commission shall promptly 
assign an investigator" for "an adjudicative 
proceeding is set or held, the commission shall 
assign an investigator to the charge" in Subsec-
tion (SXa), and "all allegations made in the 
request for agency action" for 'the allegations 
made in the charge" in Subsection (SXb); de-
leted former Subsection (3Xc), relating to the 
disclosure of information or settlement effort*; 
ANALYSIS 
Exclusive remedy. 
Exhaustion of remedies. 
Jury trial. 
No independent cause of action found. 
Procedure at hearing. 
Remedies of commission. 
Remedies of district court 
Trial de novo. 
Exclusive) remedy. 
Claims that assert a different injury than 
redesignated former Sub&rr^cr, (3Xd) as Sub-
section (3/c). inserted S !>*eci3cn (SXd); and 
rewrote the remainder cf dse taction to such an 
extent that a detanes crcscanaon would be 
impracticable. 
The 1991 amendment, effective April 29, 
1991, inserted "discriminatory or" near the end 
of Subsection (3Xc); added Subsection (4Xd); 
substituted all of the present language of Sub-
section (8Xa) beginning with "request" for "di-
rector's determination and ending the adjudi-
cative proceeding"; deleted "If a director's 
determination is dismissed" at the beginning of 
Subsection (8Kb); added "and costs* at the end 
of Subsection (9); substituted "issued by the 
presiding officer" for "by the commission" in 
Subsection (HXs); rewrote Subsections (12) 
and (IS); and made minor changes in punctua-
tion and style throughout the section. 
this statute covers, such as intentional tort 
claims, and perhaps certain state constitu-
tional claims, are not necessarily foreclosed by 
the exclusive remedy provision of Subsection 
(11) if an independent cause of action exists 
outside this chapter for such claims. Sauers v. 
Salt Lake County, 735 F. Supp. 881 CD. Utah 
1990). 
This chapter preempts common law causes of 
action for discharge in retaliation for com-
plaints of employment discrimination. Rether-
ford v. AT & T Communications of the Mt. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
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